

THE RESOURCES
OF RUSSIA
[EUSTAFIEV]

1813

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RESOURCES OF RUSSIA

THE EVENT

WAR WITH FRANCE

A SHORT HISTORY OF THE

CONFLICT

SECOND RUSSIAN CONQUEST AND RECONQUEST

CAMPAIGN IN RUSSIA

BOSTON

BY ALFRED AND FRANK

1812

THE
RESOURCES OF RUSSIA,
IN
THE EVENT
OF
A WAR WITH FRANCE ;
WITH
A SHORT DESCRIPTION OF THE
COZAKS.

==
SECOND EDITION, CORRECTED AND IMPROVED.
==

WITH
AN APPENDIX, CONTAINING A SKETCH OF THE
CAMPAIGN IN RUSSIA.

EUSTAFIEV, ALEXSIEI E.

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BOSTON,
Published at No. 4, Cornhill,
BY MUNROE AND FRANCIS.

.....
1813.

DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS, TO WIT ;

District Clerk's Office.

BE it remembered, That, on the ninth day of March, A. D. 1813, and in the thirty-seventh year of the Independence of the United States of America, MUNROE & FRANCIS, of the said district, have deposited in this office the title of a book, the right whereof they claim as proprietors, in the words following, to wit :

"The RESOURCES OF RUSSIA, in the event of a war with France ; with a short description of the Cozaks. Second edition, corrected and improved. With an appendix, containing a sketch of the campaign in Russia."

In conformity to the act of the congress of the United States, entitled, "An act for the encouragement of learning, by securing the copies of maps, charts, and books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies during the times therein mentioned ;" and also to an act, entitled, "An act supplementary to an act, entitled, an act for the encouragement of learning, by securing the copies of maps, charts, and books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies, during the times therein mentioned ; and extending the benefits thereof to the arts of designing, engraving, and etching historical and other prints."

WILLIAM S. SHAW,

Clerk of the District of Massachusetts.



Tg/99/40454

TO THE PUBLIC.

WITH that pure and unfeigned joy, which the successes of his country inspire, and which is superior to every selfish gratification arising from the pride of opinion, the author respectfully offers to the American public a second edition of the "RESOURCES OF RUSSIA," enriched by copious extracts from Sir R. Wilson's "Campaign in Poland during the years 1806 and 1807 ;" a work, which was not till lately received from England, and which is, in every respect, worthy of a distinguished officer and a sound statesman. Sir R. Wilson served the whole campaign with the Russian army ; and was then, as he is now, an eye witness to the principal transactions, that were taking place. His experience ; his not being a Russian, and therefore less suspected of national partiality ; and his writing at such a distance, and without the least concert, and yet giving the same

account of the Russians, will be considered as great and conclusive authority, by all those with whom the author of the "Resources" has the happiness to associate; who have shared with him the hopes and fears of Russia, and who have duly appreciated her sacrifices and her unceasing efforts to repel the invader. He also flatters himself that a sketch of the present campaign, and of the causes that led to it, will not be unacceptable to the American reader.

THE
RESOURCES OF RUSSIA,

&c. &c. &c.

RUSSIA, for some time past, has been the sport of twofold injustice. The inconsiderate zeal of some, who were exaggerating her power, and the rooted, persevering enmity of many, who delighted in depreciating it, have driven her, in the public opinion, from that real intermediate station, which she might claim of right, and fill without giving offence. Both friends and enemies have wronged her; and both have finished by deserting her. The former, disappointed and vexed, that she did not reach the height they wished, gave her no credit for the effort; and, by fixing unmerited disgrace on her, sought to justify their own unreasonable expectations. The latter, on the contrary, whose joy at her misfor-

tunes, could only be equalled by their grief at her successes, have steeled their breasts against every conviction in her favour ; and, chasing from their cheek the conscious blush of self-reproach, with triumphant alacrity mounted the rostrum, or with exulting eagerness seized the pen to declaim on her political impotence. Like determined atheists, they laboured wantonly to destroy the only hope and consolation, which, in the prospect of futurity, her existence presented to the suffering nations.

The *insufficiency of her resources,—the vacillation of her policy,—foreign influence and corruption,—and the defects of her military system,*—form now a creed so general, and so readily embraced, as to call loudly for a candid and impartial examination of each of these topics. In obeying this call, we may possibly discover the true proportion between our hopes and fears ; fix the balance of public judgment ; and relieve the general anxiety, as to the result of the war, which seems now stealing upon the north, with the cautious step of a midnight assassin, or of a wary wolf, whose silent approaches in the depth of darkness are only betrayed by the portentous glare of his eye.

Whether the following sheets may prove satisfactory or not, I shall find some consolation in having attempted to perform my duty ; and in having led the way for some abler pen to undertake and successfully to execute the task, in which it may be my misfortune to fail. I must be understood to proceed upon a general principle, independent of accident ; and not influenced by the question, whether the expected war will or will not take place ; and whether it may happen sooner, or later. Come when it will, the ability of Russia to defend herself is the only object of this inquiry. I must further premise, that, in the progress of this little work, I have entirely confined myself to the Russian authorities ; and left foreign writers to reconcile, as well as they can, their own contradictions. I feel the more justified in this preference, as a complete statistical account of the Russian empire has been published, as late as the year 1808, under the sanction of government, and with a free use of all the official documents in the various departments of state. The correctness of this account is unquestionable, and supersedes all foreign accounts ; inasmuch as these never could have been

made with the same advantages of necessary information.

First then, *as to the insufficiency of resources.*

The population of Russia, as a source of national strength, claims our earliest consideration. The first computation was made by order of Peter the Great, in the year 1719 ; and the return was 14 millions of both sexes, including the Ukraine, and the newly conquered countries of Estonia, Livonia, and part of Finland. So small a return, notwithstanding the considerable acquisition of territory, will not be surprising, when we reflect on the anarchy, confusion, cruel wars, and other calamities, which had, in the preceding ages, desolated the Russian empire.

By the second enumeration, in 1743, there appeared an increase of upwards of two millions ; and by the third, in 1761, of four millions more. In the year 1781, when a fourth report was made, eight millions were gained ; and the fifth and last census, which took place in 1794, by an accession of four millions, gave the total at 32 million inhabitants. About this time, from 1794 to 1795, the annexation of Lithuania and Courland to the Russian crown, brought in five millions

more, and increased the whole population to 37 millions.

As no disastrous events have since impeded the progressive operation of natural causes ; and as the tables presented annually to the synod, from all the parishes throughout the empire, of births, marriages, and deaths, show the regular annual increase of 500,000 for each year ; we can, without fear of error, state the present population of Russia, ending with the last year (1811), at 45 and half, or at 46 millions, if we add the tract of country acquired from Poland by the treaty of Tilsit.

This is a prodigious population, and inferior only to that of France, swelled beyond all proportion with the overflowing tribute of her conquests. But the formidable magnitude of numbers, with regard to Russia, does not afford a safe ground for conclusion ; and like the rising moon, reflected and magnified by the floating vapours in the atmosphere, deceives the eye, as to its real appearance. The population to be efficient, must be in some degree commensurate with the territory ; and a single glance at the geographical situation of Russia is sufficient to show how immensely the latter exceeds the former. Her 46 mil-

lion inhabitants, if distributed over the surface of no less than 340,000 geographical square miles (16,000,000 square wersts, or near 11,000,000 English square miles), will appear like a few solitary shrubs, scattered over a vast desert to remind the traveller of helpless weakness, rather than of energetic grandeur. The proportion of 46 million souls to the stated number of geographical miles, will be only 129 souls to each square mile ; and when it is considered that in France and other populous countries in Europe, each square mile is supposed to contain about 2000 people, the ability of Russia to make conquests, and even to preserve her existence as a nation, will appear a miracle, or one of those phenomena in the political world, which set conjecture at defiance, and mock every effort to comprehend them.

The prospective contemplation of 875 millions of souls, which Russia ought to have, in proportion to her territory and the population of other countries, only heightens the sense of her present deficiency ; and harasses the mind with doubts whether, owing to the rigorous climate and other causes, unfavourable to her northern possessions, she can ever hope

for such an increase as would place her in every respect on a par with other powers ; and whether it would not be best, for the peace and happiness of mankind, that such a project should never be realized.

In pursuing, however, this track of reasoning, we should escape one error only to fall into another of a no less serious nature ; and to appear as voluntary followers in the train of those, with whom spots pass for eclipses, and who find it painful to turn their eyes for one moment from the unfavourable view of the picture.

We have only to choose the middle way, and the vast disproportion between the population and territory of Russia, as well as the apprehensions thereby excited, will be wonderfully lessened by the discovery, that no less than three fourths of her immense territory contain only one fifteenth part of her population ; and that, consequently, fourteen fifteenths of her population are concentrated only on one fourth of her territory. In other words, to the 258,000 geogr. square miles which Siberia contains, there are 3 million inhabitants ; and to the 82,000 geog. square miles of Russia in Europe, there remain 43

millions, which is more than one fourth of 160 millions, said to be the whole population of Europe. Twelve persons in Siberia and near 700 in the European part of Russia to each geogr. square mile, must therefore be a fair and correct calculation ; and though it is much below the standard of European population, appearance, even in this case, is more unfavourable than reality ; for, many parts of European Russia, especially towards the north, are very thinly inhabited, and bear almost the same small proportion to the rest, as does Siberia. The thickest population of Russia is between 48° and 55° of latitude, and from 42° to 68° of longitude, comparatively on a small space, including the governments of *Moskow*, *Wladimir*, *Riazan*, *Kursk*, *Orlow*, *Charkow*, *Voronej*, *Penza*, *Kazan*, *Tambow*, *Poltava*, *Tchernigoff*, *Minsk*, and others ; some of which contain from 1300 to 2400 souls to each square mile, and bring Russia nearer to an equality with other powers, than may have been at first imagined.

If the comparison should still be in favour of France, it will be lessened by the consideration, that her population is more numerical than effective ; and that this last, as it appears

at present, is better preserved in Russia, where persons from 20 to 30 years of age are not near so scarce as in France. Besides, national strength, derived from population, depends in a great measure on the peculiar character of that population ; and on the energy of government in seizing and bringing that character into action. Of the first, almost every page of the ancient and modern history of Russia presents us with the most pleasing assurances ; as to the last, we have no reason to be distrustful, since the contest, which the Russian government is likely to maintain, will be no longer for any foreign interest, but for her own immediate defence and safety. The question will not be whether Austria or Prussia are to be assisted with her arms ; or whether England is to be supported in her intercourse with the European continent ; but whether Russia shall exist, or be erased from the list of nations. France cannot, as formerly, pretend that she entertains no direct hostility, and no wish to invade the territories or destroy the political influence of Russia. The enemy's designs will be unmasked ; and his arms openly pointed against the dearest interests of Russia. His assaults will have no

other plea, than inordinate ambition ; an avowed object of enmity ; a manifest desire to molest and destroy ; and a premeditated, unwarrantable appeal to force : he, therefore, will be opposed with corresponding vigour, and a determination suitable to the pressing occasion ; with a magnanimity and patience fully proportionate to the magnitude of danger ; and with that firmness and perseverance, which, if protracted, will be finally crowned with success. It would be no less unjust to suppose the Russian government so wanting in wisdom and foresight, as not to have beheld the enemy's preparations with a suspicious and jealous eye. Whatever may be his success, it will not be owing to the chance of surprise.

Nor are the pecuniary means, which are emphatically called the sinews of war, so scanty in Russia, as they have been generally imagined. The comparatively low state of her finances, if fairly viewed, may tend to raise our confidence rather than depress it.

The following are the sources of the yearly revenue of Russia.

	Roubles.
Poll tax - - -	52,000,000
Duties on distilleries -	25,000,000
Custom-House duties -	13,000,000
Produce of the mines and the mint - - -	10,000,000
Stamp duties - -	8,000,000
Fisheries, mills, forests and post-offices - -	6,000,000
The tribute of subjected nations	1,000,000
Total	115,000,000

As this revenue is not dependent on the fluctuating state of foreign exchange, it must be calculated at par ; and is therefore equal to 15 million pounds sterling. Unquestionably it makes no figure by the side of 30 millions in the disposal of France, or 50 millions annually brought to the British exchequer ; but then it should be considered, that the above revenue of Russia is free, permanent, unincumbered with heavy interest on national debt, and has all those additional sources untouched, which in France and England are nearly exhausted.

The system of taxation can scarcely be said to exist in Russia. The poll-tax, amounting

to little more than one rouble per head, and being nearly all the people pay, certainly deserves not the name of a system. The manufacturing interest, if we except the articles exported, is not burthened with taxes ; and from its visible progress, as appears from the yearly important diminution of almost 2 million roubles in the imports of foreign manufactures, this branch of industry promises to Russia, in the hour of need, no inconsiderable support.

The produce and consumption of salt, amounting yearly to 20 million pouds, upwards of 300,000 tons, formerly an important branch of revenue to the government, but now free and unproductive, may be resumed on emergency, and under the auspices of the superior administration now placed over it, may be rendered more than ever profitable. All the branches of agriculture, as regards consumption at home, are free from taxes, and may be made largely to contribute to the relief of national necessities. Russia has not as yet had recourse to duties on malt liquors, the consumption of which is immense ; or on houses, windows, dogs, coaches, and every domestic and foreign luxury ; nor has she wielded yet the potent engine of a funding

system. In short, she has the example of France and England before her ; and if the worst comes, she can but relieve herself in the same manner ; though, I think, she is in no immediate danger of being driven to this extremity.

Her commerce, though small, when compared with that of England, is profitable enough to bear additional burthens ; and her circulating capital, which is computed at 200 million roubles in specie, and 109 millions in paper, exhibits at once the sufficiency of her credit and the solid foundation of her prosperity. Add to this, that she never subsisted on foreign plunder, as France has done, and never counted it one of the principal sources of her revenue ; the approaching annihilation, therefore, of this source, in proportion as the countries which supplied it became more and more exhausted, may soon reduce her formidable rival to an equality with herself.

Granting, however, the balance at all events to be against her, as to the relative means and resources of France ;* the advantage of acting

* Russia is certainly competent to meet France properly so called ; but here the question is, wheth-

on the defensive is more than sufficient to turn the scale in her favour. In this point of view, we have to consider, not whether she can go as far as France in sending and maintaining troops abroad ; but whether she has a sufficient force at home to repel the enemy ; and whether her internal resources are adequate to the support, maintenance, and due exertion of that force. This is a cheering subject : and we shall take a short retrospective view of it.

A century ago, that is, in the year 1712, the military force of Russia amounted in all to 107,350 men. As this muster was made three years after the memorable battle of Poltava, I cannot help observing here, that unless Peter the Great had brought almost every soldier he had into the field, a thing in its very nature impossible, the statements of Swedish and other foreign historians of 80,000 men in one place, and as many in another, with which Peter overwhelmed Charles, must appear to every intelligent and candid man,

er Russia can repel France supported by Austria, Prussia, Italy, the Rhenish confederacy, and indeed whole continental Europe, combined.

what it really is, an absurd and inconsistent exaggeration.

At the death of Peter, the country inherited from his genius and perseverance a well appointed and disciplined army of 200,000 men, having almost doubled within the short period of twelve years, that is, from 1712 to 1725, when that great prince died. In 1771 it was considerably augmented : and from that time to 1794 it was increased to 312,785 men ; and now it is not much less than 700,000 men. The following are its component parts :

REGULAR TROOPS.

	Rank and file
1. Life Guards (horse) consisting of five regiments - -	3,316
2. do. foot, six regiments -	9,306
3. Field Cavalry, 46 regiments	49,788
4. do. Infantry, 130 do.	219,125
5. Garrisons, 19 do.	70,884
6. Artillery - - -	42,963
	395,381
Officers - - - -	12,709
Total	<u>408,090</u>

IRREGULAR.

Different regiments of Calmucks,	
Tartars, Don Cozaks, &c. &c.	98,211
Officers - - - -	2,189
Total	100,400
Invalids, including officers	24,660
Grand total	533,150

The provinces, which were mentioned before as the most populous in the Russian empire, and which contain about 15 millions of male population, by a new levy in 1806 of one in a hundred, furnished an additional number of 150,000 men ; which makes the present force of Russia amount to 683,150 men. By deducting 70,884 for garrisons, and 24,660 invalids, there remains 587,606 effective men ; or 487,206 regulars, and 100,400 irregulars, a force which, if assisted by local advantages, can defy the united efforts of all the invaders Europe can send against her.*

* Sir Robert Wilson, in his brief Remarks on the composition of the Russian army, speaks thus :

“THE INFANTRY is generally composed of athletic men between the ages of 18 and 40, endowed

It is a consoling and pleasing consideration, that the population of Russia has not since

with great bodily strength, but generally of short stature, with martial countenance and complexion.

The bayonet is a truly Russian weapon. The British alone are authorised to dispute their exclusive pretension to this arm; but as the Russian soldier is chosen for the army, out of a numerous population, with the greatest attention to his physical powers, the battalions of the former have superior advantages. No man even with bad teeth is enlisted.

The untrained Russian also, like the Briton, undaunted, whilst he can affront the danger, disdains the protection of favouring ground, or the example of his adversary, and presents his body exposed from head to foot, either to the aim of the marksman, or the storm of the cannonade.

THE LIGHT INFANTRY is augmenting since the late war; and as Russia possesses a population well adapted for this service in various parts of her empire, she ought to extend it considerably.

The regiments of Light Infantry, hitherto formed, are of an excellent description, and it is impossible to imagine a more beautiful body than the Chasseurs of the Guard, who, it is said, come chiefly from Siberia; indeed, this is the province where the best marksmen and of the hardest race are recruited, although, in general, the men are lighter. They know their service perfectly: and as many of these men, in common with other regiments, had marched more than three thousand miles to join the army;

been drained by fresh levies, as it has been in France by the system of conscription, enforced

as the vicissitude of a Siberian winter, and the raging heat of Asiatic deserts were familiar to them, they possessed a natural training and stamina which qualified them in the highest degree for the service they were required to encounter.

GUARDS. It cannot be doubted but that the picked men of such a population as Russia, a country where man is so well grown, must compose a superior body of foot guards, whose numbers do not exceed 7000. There cannot be a nobler corps, or one of more warlike description, and the simplicity of dress gives to the man the full character of his figure and mien. On every occasion the Guards have distinguished themselves : and it is singular in this service that the whole army prides itself in their majesty and excellence. All extol ; all joy in their perfections ; and the sentiment of jealousy is unknown.

At Tilsitz the guards of France, of Russia, and some of Prussia, paraded in the same town. Those of France, whatever may be their military merits, made but a very indifferent appearance, and, being generally small men, the grenadier high cap had an effect contrary to ornament or grandeur.—Those of Prussia were too much ruined to be estimated justly, yet the stature and proportion were better than those of France ; but the guards of Russia surpassed both “ as day-light doth a lamp.” They exhibited a combination of form and stature, of manly expression and warlike simplicity, of martial character and beauty

ed and executed, with such rigour, in anticipation. Moreover, a militia was raised in the

which was not only unrivalled, but elevated above all comparison.

THE RUSSIAN CAVALRY is certainly the best mounted of any upon the continent ; and as English horses never can serve abroad in English condition, it is the best mounted in Europe.

Hungary and Turkey may perhaps produce horses as well adapted for the hussar and irregular services, but the heavy Russian horses are matchless for an union of size, strength, activity and hardiness ; whilst formed with the bulk of the British cart-horse, they have so much blood as never to be coarse, and withal are so supple as naturally to adapt themselves to the manège, and receive the highest degree of dressing.

They are chiefly bred in the plains of the Don and the Volga ; but as the native breed of those countries, and of the surrounding nations is of inferior size, it is not improbable that they are descendants of the celebrated Cappadocian breed, introduced into Europe by the Romans, and (which is remarkable,) into Nubia, by a present of three hundred from the Emperor Constantine to one of the African princes, where they seem to have preserved all their character and powers, whilst the influence of European climate or food has somewhat degenerated their stature. Bruce, when in Nubia, first noticed this gigantic and peculiar species, but the statement increased the charges of invention against this much wronged traveller ; and Bruce, not recollecting the Roman present, da-

same year (1806), of no less than 600,000 men, who were already in motion, and in con-

ted their introduction to the time of the Saracen conquests, which origin not being supported by any collateral evidence, was too vague for such a remarkable exception to the race of Arabia, Egypt, and Abyssinia : but it was reserved for the period of the Egyptian expedition to vindicate Bruce by the corroboration of the fact of the existence of such a breed of horses.

After the battle of Eylau, when the Imperial cavalry of the guards were ordered from St. Petersburg to join the army in Poland, the men were sent in waggons as far as Riga, and the horses accompanied at the rate of 50 miles each day. From thence they were ridden, and proceeded to their station at the rate of 35 miles each day ; after a march of 700 miles, so conducted, they appeared not only in excellent comparative order, but in such high condition, that the regular garrisons of any capital in Europe could not present a finer cavalry parade. The hussar horse has nothing remarkable, except that he is generally stronger loined than the Hungarian, with equal blood, and force of constitution.

During Beningzen's retreat, and from that period to the disappearance of the snow in June, no cavalry ever encountered greater hardship.

For above six months in the severity of the extremest Poland winter, they were always at the piquet post without any shelter ; and for three months, or more, they had no other sustenance than what the old thatch, stripped from the roofs of the cottages,

dition to take the field. In consequence of the peace of Tilsit, this force was dismissed,

supplied ; and in consequence of this necessity Poland was progressively rendered uninhabitable, and war assumed her most frightful aspect.

The mortality certainly was great, but it did not render the cavalry inefficient or feeble for the service of the most active and laborious campaign which succeeded.

The appointments are of the best quality, superior to most of the continental nations ; but latterly, France has applied so much attention to the improvement of her cavalry equipment, that she may dispute the preference. The mode of hanging up the bit to the check of the halter, or bridle, so as to loosen or suspend it with rapid facility, is, however, a Russian improvement, not yet adopted by other countries.

In war they are alert and intelligent :—in battle brave and capable of every evolution and operation :—they charge with rapidity and union, and in all the actions their loss from gallant enterprize and efforts was considerable. At Eylau they sustained the tremendous fire with heroic fortitude, and made some desperate and successful attacks. At the battle of Friedland, when Buonaparte, by the superiority of numbers, had forced the Russian left, and gained possession of the town of Friedland, with the bridges over the Aller ;—notwithstanding their losses on a day where they had repeatedly charged ;—notwithstanding the position in which they were now expos-

with the exception of those who wished to enlist in the regular army, and with the reserva-

ed, and the ruin that threatened by delay in the field ; — animated with a generous resolution to save the centre and right wing of their army, they rushed across the plain, charged the advancing centre of the enemy, and by their daring efforts and bold countenance, enabled the retreat of the infantry, with all their cannon, through an almost impracticable ford, in the presence of Buonaparte and 80,000 men ; and subsequently so covered the march upon the Aller, which was to be passed again at Wehlau, and over the Memel, (upon each of which rivers there is but one bridge, and from Friedland, an intervening open country of about 120 miles) that Murat and Buonaparte could effect nothing against a defeated force, reduced to 34,000 men, and after Lestocq's union, incumbered with above 500 pieces of cannon and 10,000 carriages, of which they lost not one, whereas the French cavalry, who were obliged to remain united, with all their caution, experienced loss and disgrace.

The officers of the Russian cavalry attend to their various duties with great zeal and diligence, and the whole interior economy is well regulated and administered.

THE RUSSIAN ARTILLERY is of the most powerful description. No other army moves with so many guns, and with no other army is it in a better state of equipment, or is more gallantly served.

The piece is well formed, and the carriage solid, without being heavy. The harness and the rope-tackling is of the best quality for service, and all the ap-

tion of 200,000 men, for any future emergency ; so that with this ample reserve, and in

purtenances of the gun complete and well arranged. The draught horses are small, but of great muscular strength, strongly loined, and with high blood. Four draw the light field-pieces, and eight the twelve pounders ; the latter have sometimes indeed ten horses ; but then the roads must be such as are only to be met with in Poland before the frost sets in, or when it breaks up, and which, during the last campaign, were in such a state that Buonaparte said he had discovered, by crossing the Vistula, *the new element of mud*. The power of these animals is however so great, that, on taking up positions, they will plunge through the ditches filled with yielding snow, although so deep as to cover their back, and bury the guns altogether ; and when the center and right wing retired through the Aller, after the battle of Friedland, at a point discovered on the emergency, they were partly swimming, and afterwards compelled to ascend the banks, which were almost perpendicular. If the horses had possessed less strength or activity, the whole must have fallen into the hands of the enemy ; but the Russians seem well aware of the importance of horsing their artillery well, and the Russian government is wise enough to spare no expense that may be necessary for its efficiency and security.

The drivers are stout men : like all other drivers, they require superintendance in times of danger, to prevent their escape with the horses, but on various occasions they have also shewn great courage and fi-

consequence of the natural progress of population in five years, or the great number of

delity ; and they have the essential merit of carefully providing subsistence for their horses.

When the Russian army was in Poland, above 500 pieces of field-cannon moved with it generally, and were actually in the battle of Eylau. Benningzen had indeed left in his previous movements towards the Bug 120 pieces, chiefly of 12 pounders in reserve, which fortunately escaped Bernadotte's column, and only entered the field in the evening before the general action. Its safety may indeed be owing to the capture of the courier, which gave Benningzen notice at Mohrungen of Buonaparte's intention to assemble his army and attack him, whilst by the interception of the despatches Bernadotte's orders to manœuvre on his right and in his rear were delayed two days—important days, for they preserved the Russian army, as well as the reserve cannon, by enabling them to reach Eylau without such further impediment. This number was certainly out of proportion to the infantry, which at the outset never amounted to 80,000 men, and was particularly inconvenient and embarrassing in countries and seasons when forage was not to be assured. In the latter part of the campaign, when the infantry was by sanguinary actions greatly reduced, the number of guns was a real disadvantage, and endangered the safety to the army by the delays it occasioned.

During the late campaigns the Russians lost very little artillery. At Pultusk some few after the action

those who have attained the proper age for service, Russia bids fair to maintain the conventional order of battle. The Russian cannon were completely smothered in the mud, and the French lost as many of theirs in the same way.

In the retreat from Yankova to Eylau, notwithstanding the daily serious conflicts, they did not lose ten pieces. At Eylau, they left the next morning 12 pieces that had been damaged, but withdrew above 30 of the enemy's guns. At Heilsberg they lost in the retreat of Prince Bragration, and previous to the attack on the position three or four, at Friedland only 17. And at Austerlitz their cannon fell into the enemy's hands, from an error in the road, and not from the achievements of victory in that field, although Buonaparte in his despatches announces their capture as so many trophies gained on that day.—According to the French bulletins indeed, the Russians lost 300 pieces of cannon from December to June, of which above 200 pieces were lost at, and previous to the battle of Eylau ; but the falsehood was so gross, that to account for their disappearance, he shrewdly ordered them to be melted for the erection of a bronze statue to the memory of General Haultpoult, an excellent officer of cavalry, killed at Eylau, but the 64th bulletin of the French army, out-herods herod—“On this subject it has been remarked, that the Emperor has never lost any cannon in the armies he commanded, whether in the first campaigns of Egypt, whether with that of the Army of Reserve, with that of Austria and Moravia, or in Prussia and Poland.”—If this fact is to rest on French authority, certainly

test without resorting to any extraordinary measure, and exhausting those regular and main sources of strength, which in the last extremity must still prove her safeguard. She may still present—what imperial France cannot—the cheerful countenance of man. From St. Petersburg to Moskow, and from Moskow to the Euxine, the traveller may still see that active and smiling industry, which neither feels nor fears the hostile sword—but which, in the regions of France, shrinks with

none was or ever will be lost ; but a more impudent falsehood was never published for French credulity.

The Russians, however, wisely do not attach too much reputation or disgrace to the possession or loss of a gun. They think that it is better to fight it to the last moment, and let an enemy gain it dearly, than withdraw it too soon for a preservation that also preserves the enemy.

The Cozak artillery, worked by Cozaks, which is a late institution, consisted of 24 pieces extremely light, and the carriages were fashioned with a care and nicety which did great credit to Russian workmanship. This park joined at Heilsberg, after the battle of Eylau, and in a march of 3000 wersts, one werst $\frac{3}{4}$ of an English mile, in the course of 14 weeks, not one horse was disabled or died, and it was soon afterwards brought into action, and did considerable execution on the enemy near Allerstein, nor was one piece lost during the whole campaign."

the chill blast of war, and withers in the meretricious embraces of a hollow peace. The tearful eye, the mournful visage, the wide spreading desolation,* and the melancholy spectacle of helpless infancy, and tottering age, torn from their natural prop of manhood; all the calamities, which France in the fulness of her pride and the wanton exertion of her power has brought upon herself, while wishing to afflict others,—are yet unknown, unfelt, and unseen in Russia : and may remain so, though hosts of foes should conspire her ruin.

The natural situation of Russia is such, that she can with ease and convenience maintain and support while on her own ground, not only the formidable force she possesses, but double that number, if necessity should require it. All her means are within herself ; and no country in the known world is so little dependent on commercial or any other in-

* The author's personal experience, and all recent accounts of France confirm the desertion of roads even in the vicinity of Paris ; and the difficulty of meeting, out of the army, young persons from 17 to 30 years of age. Boys, women, and old men are the only beings that present themselves to the sight of a traveller.

tercourse with foreign nations. Could commodities or the necessaries themselves be transported with the same facility as money which represents them, she might provide for her armies, at any distance from home, better than any power in Europe, France herself not excepted. There is nothing relating to the maintenance of an army, but what she can draw from herself, find on her own land, and manufacture with her own hands ; an advantage which she preeminently enjoys, of which no external cause can deprive her, and which, as long as it is enjoyed, must render her, on her own territory, invincible. Food, clothing, and ammunition of every kind are amply supplied to her by art and nature ; and placed at her absolute disposal.

From the report of the minister of the interior on agriculture, for the years 1802, 1803, and 1804, it appears, that, after all the exports to foreign countries, and all the deductions for distilleries, and those provinces or governments which are unfavourably situated, and where annual harvests are not sufficient to maintain the inhabitants ; there remained, as an average surplus of corn for each year, 50 million tchetwerts, or 450 million pouds, about 7 million tons ; which, if sold at the

usual price of 4 roubles per tchetwert, would bring Russia 200 million roubles a year, almost twice as much as the whole revenue of the empire. Those who calculate the resources of Russia only by their nominal representation, money, will do well to pause and reflect awhile on the above prodigious source within herself, which must increase with the population, and outrun, for whole centuries to come, the demand at home, by reason of the vast superabundance of soil, and which may, ere long, be converted into the circulating medium.

The cloth manufactories of Russia, according to the report of 1804, were 1553 in number, containing 2428 looms ; and employing 28,689 hands of both sexes. The quantity of cloth, manufactured that year only for the army, was 1,806,632 arshins, or about 1,405,158 English yards.

The leather manufactories, 850 in number, which, besides domestic consumption, exported in the year 1804 to the value of 1,786,871 roubles ; as well as the linen manufactories, 285 in number, employing 23,711 hands, and enabling Russia annually to make considerable exports, are too well known to suppose

the Russian soldier can ever be in want of things so necessary to his health and comfort.

The manufactory of arms in Tula, from 1770 to 1780, produced upwards of 162,500 muskets, and 63,000 pair of pistols, besides the correspondent number of swords, sabres, and other arms, at the low rate of 4 roubles per musket, and the rest in proportion. The annual produce of this manufactory must have materially increased since 1780, though no account of it has yet been published. There are besides, several other manufactories of less importance, which however furnish a considerable quantity of arms every year, and secure Russia against any want in articles of such indispensable utility. The Russian soldier has not, as yet, used any other arms than what were manufactured at home. A small supply from England, in the last war, had for its object to assist Prussia, and was not received in time.

The copper mines of Russia, through the means of her founderies, can always supply her with the requisite proportion of cannon. Her iron mines are too well known to need any comment ; and the produce of her gold and silver mines is nearly the whole circula-

ting specie, the amount of which has already been mentioned. Her lead mines are also sufficient to supply her wants ; and the following is the annual quantity of metal in pouds, and value in roubles.

	Pouds.	Roubles.	Copecks.	Value in roubles.
<i>Gold</i>	40	15,000	pr. poud	600,000
<i>Silver</i>	1300	1,000	"	1,300,000
<i>Lead</i>	50,000	4	"	400,000
<i>Copper</i>	185,000	20	"	7,000,000
<i>Iron</i>	8,000,000	4,80	"	14,000,000
Total	8,236,340			Total 20,400,000

Owing to the natural abundance of all the necessary materials, the quantity of gunpowder manufactured in Russia has always been more than sufficient not only for public purposes but for the private use of individuals. The frequent fire-works, being the favourite amusement of the Russians in general, are supposed to consume more gunpowder than would supply the army of a moderate power. For want of documents to ascertain the exact quantity with which Russia is yearly furnished ; we must take its cheapness as the criterion of its abundance. The foreign supply of powder as well as lead, which was drawn from England during the late war, was

merely on account of the ships of the line which were at a distance from home.

It does not come within my present object to give a statement of all the manufactures in Russia, which, generally speaking, are such as to make her independent in all the necessities, and in some of the luxuries of civilized life ; and it was sufficient to mention only those which are intimately connected with the maintenance of her military force, in order to shew that her efforts are not likely to experience a check from any failure of natural or artificial resources, as regards her own defence and protection. We shall, however, be further convinced of this by considering at what small expense her armies are supported, and how ample are her nominal or pecuniary means, in relation to the real commodities or necessities, which she can always purchase from her own subjects, and obtain from her own soil.

The whole of her regular forces cost in time of peace only 10,683,711 roubles ; which, in proportion to her revenue, being a little more than a 15th part of the whole, is certainly cheaper than in any military nation in Europe. In time of war, the additional expense is only 200,000 roubles ; and if we add

the irregular troops, which, with the exception of officers, receive their pay only for the time of actual service, we cannot be far from truth in stating the whole expense at 11 million roubles ; a very small portion, which can be easily spared from the revenue of 115 millions.

The first idea that occurs on seeing this statement is, the miserable, starving state of the soldier ; but the advantage of possessing *real* means will soon banish this idea, and shew the Russian soldier, though apparently worse paid, yet substantially better maintained perhaps than in any other country. The average sum, which he receives, about 12 roubles and 50 copecks a year, is certainly a trifling pay ; but then he is provided with flour and other articles of provision, which are sufficient to support him through the year, and enable him in some measure to consider his pay as mere pocket money. His clothing, which is entirely at the expense of government, costs only 12 roubles extra ; and affords an additional proof that a government, possessed of a revenue so large in proportion to its expenses, can raise, in self-defence, increase, and main-

tain a force adequate to every political emergency.

How far we may rely on the moral character of the Russian population, under a well directed government, history can furnish facts on which it will be perfectly safe and just to reason.

During the period of terror and desolation, which terminated in the election of Michael, ancestor of Peter the Great, to the Russian throne, the reins of government were abandoned to the uncontrolled rage of anarchy and lawless faction, and Russia, torn by internal and external wars, was neither able to crush the domestic traitor that fed upon her vitals, nor resist the insolence and wanton cruelty of the foreign invader. Impostors multiplying fast, and rebels springing up on all sides, harassed her provinces and preyed upon her towns ; while the ferocious Tartar ravaged her fields, and spread, far and wide, the torrent of destruction over her dominions. The rapacious Pole found way to Moskow, and held it firmly in his grasp ; and the Swede, in the seeming garb of a deliverer, perfidiously seized on Novgorod, and unblushingly extended his usurpations to other cities.

The empire was assailed in all its points at once. Serpents nestled in its bosom, and its extremities were lacerated with the edge of the enemy's steel. No arm was uplifted in its defence ; for the few, that were faithful to its cause, had been dispersed and exterminated. National spirit was subdued, national efforts were paralyzed ; and the country was sinking apparently to rise no more. The whole space of Russia was within the city-walls of Nijney-Novgorod ; and there also was her final deliverance.

Kuzma Minin, a person of mean condition, by trade a butcher, in spirit a patriot, and in deed a hero, suddenly appears in the market-place with all his property at his feet. He calls on his townsmen, he paints in true colours the miseries of their country, points to his bare arms, and swears to exert them for its deliverance or lose them ; he points to his property, swears to sacrifice it in the common cause ; and his manly appeal thrills like an electrical shock, through every heart, and in a thousand breasts at once kindles the noble flame of patriotism. The citizens hear him, and vow to conquer or to die. They follow his example, they bring all their property to

the common stock, they seize their arms, they raise a number of warriors from the sale of their effects, they enlist their children and servants, they place the gallant *Pojarsky*, a noble veteran, at their head, they march against the enemy, they drive him as the rising tempest does the autumn leaves ; and in a few weeks, the impostors, the rebels, the Tartars, the Poles, and the Swedes, were seen no more. Russia, astonished and rejoiced, could only observe, by the bloody track left behind, which way her enemies had disappeared. She looked back with the assured eye of experience, respired with conscious gratitude under the protecting shadow of the family of Romanow, and with prophetic delight contemplated her future greatness.

So small were the means, and so great was the event ; yet nothing in all this was extraordinary or miraculous. The whole was the natural result of the inherent energies of Russia, which did not break forth only for want of proper excitement. Russia was not prostrated or undone ; she slept, and had only to wake in order to shake off her ignominious fetters. It was a giant stumbling over the rock of faction, somewhat hurt, but not crush-

ed ; a feeble hand chanced to bind his wounds, and helped him to rise—and his first step was a total destruction of his foes. It was a dormant mass of combustible ingredients, pent up for years within the bowels of the earth, which wanted only the help of a spark to throw off in an instant the cumbrous weight that pressed it down.

Such was, and still is the character of the Russian people. Instead of degenerating, it has improved with the general civilization and social order since that time introduced, and till now happily maintained. What benefit has been subsequently derived from a character so improved, we may judge by the glorious and unprecedented reign of Peter the Great, who with only 7 million of male population, and 8 million roubles of revenue, was enabled to fortify the boundaries, to build fleets, to raise cities, to maintain armies, to subsidize his allies with troops and treasure, to unite the Caspian and Black Sea with the Baltick, by means of prodigious canals—the completion of which is reserved for the happy reign of Alexander—to make head against his combined enemies, and finally to come off a

conqueror from the protracted and sanguinary contest of twenty years.

And shall the increased resources of Russia—shall her prowess, so often tried and grown to maturity, be now deemed so little, as to excite no respect, and no confidence? Shall her advantages and her reputation, the laborious acquisition of years, be in a moment surrendered at the shrine of that terrific idol, which the name of France has set up for universal worship and adoration? Has the prosperity, bequeathed by Peter the Great to his country, so little solidity in it, that the first bold invader may, if he pleases, pull it down, like some gorgeous overgrown fabric, too heavy for its puny and slender foundation? No! Impossible! The enemy that hopes to conquer Russia, on her own territory, must be prepared to pay in tenfold measure for each drop of blood she sheds, and for each groan that may be extorted from her. Before she falls, every one of her 700,000 warriors, and more, if necessary, must be destroyed; and every one will be preceded by many a foe to his grave. The Russian soldier, ever since he has been invested with that name, has not

once yet flinched from combat,* and ere he dies, in a cause so dear, will execute such

* The individual superiority of the Russian soldier cannot be doubted by those, who are in any degree acquainted with his character. The physical strength of man is nearly the same in all countries ; yet there are various and powerful causes, which, in the exertion and application of that strength, may produce a considerable difference between the natives of one country and another ; *local connection ; local prejudices ; the imperceptible influence of a peculiar construction of laws, and a peculiar formation of society ; temporary enthusiasm ; principle ; and habits of life ;* are so many causes whose operation is very powerful in producing that difference. Thus a Frenchman's superiority consists at present in temporary *enthusiasm*, created by the revolution, and maintained by Buonaparte's subsequent victories ; that of an Englishman in *principle*, a cause whose action is *permanent*, as far as the stability of the human mind can go. *Habits of life* are to the body what *principle* is to the mind. The union of both must make the possessor doubly strong, and their operation must be more powerful and lasting in proportion. The Russian soldier is the only one, perhaps, in whom these two causes are closely united. The habits of his life are such, that there is no soldier in the world whose wants are fewer, and who can bear fatigue and the hardships of war with equal fortitude. He is truly indefatigable. He can brave hunger, thirst, weather, want of rest, unusual toils, and extraordi-

revenge, as in a short time will leave the enemy no victims to feed it.

ry privations, to the utmost and almost incredible stretch of the physical powers of man. It is by no means an uncommon thing for a Russian soldier to march three days and nights almost without interruption ; engage the enemy immediately ; fight again for as long a period of time, and come off victorious. It was this extraordinary physical strength, that is acquired and improved by habit, which prevented the otherwise certain junction of Moreau and Macdonald in Italy ; who never believed, never thought it was possible for one of them to be separated from the other, and defeated by an enemy so distant from both.

The *passive strength* of a Russian soldier, or *the ability* of suffering long all bodily inconveniences, owing to the same habit, is almost unexampled. As to his *principle*, it is exclusively calculated to make him *invincible*.

That *principle* is founded upon religion, and sacred devotion to duty. He goes to battle with an almost certain anticipation of his end ; to meet which he is not only resigned, but even determined. To die in battle, he thinks, is a straight road to Heaven ; Death, therefore, which is the only enemy that could make him shrink from combat, is the very one whom he seeks to encounter, and who, so far from being an object of fear to him, is that of a joyful expectation of a glorious reward hereafter. The only danger he knows and fears, is to disobey his officer's commands. Such is his sense, opinion, and conviction of duty, which is constantly uppermost in his

Of the pretended *vacillation of policy*, with which Russia has been charged, I have only

thoughts, excluding every idea of peril and danger, that to fulfil it, to execute his orders, or do nothing contrary to them, is his only system, admitting of no modification in peculiar cases of imminent danger, of no exception, no allowance whatever. To perform whatever he is commanded, or to die, is the only alternative he adopts. Were one officer, and one soldier only, left on the field, out of a whole Russian army, and surrounded by thousands of the victorious enemy, the soldier would not lay down his arms, if the officer commanded him not to do it. Indeed, there have been instances approaching to this as near as possible.

Sir Robert Wilson says, the Russian soldiers are “inured to the extremes of weather and hardship ; to the worst and scantiest food ; to marches for days and nights, of four hours repose and six hours progress ; accustomed to laborious toils, and the carriage of heavy burthens ; ferocious, but disciplined ; obstinately brave, and susceptible of enthusiastic excitements ; devoted to their sovereign, their chief, and their country.—Religious without being weakened by superstition ; patient, docile, and obedient ; possessing all the energetic characteristics of a barbarian people, with the advantages engrafted by civilization.

Nature has provided in them the most excellent materials for a military establishment. No genius

to trace the origin to that political and self-conscious delinquency, which had no other means to screen itself from the piercing eye

is required to create, method is only needed to arrange, and ability to command.

No carnage intimidates the survivors ; bullets may destroy, but the aspect of death awes not, even when a commander's evident error has assigned the fatal station.—“ Comrades, go not forward into the trenches,” cried out a retiring party to an advancing detachment ; “ retreat with us, or you will be lost, for the enemy are already in possession.” “ Prince Potemkin must look to that, for it was he who gave us the order : come on, Russians,” replied the commander. And he and his men marched forward, and perished, the victims of their courageous sense of duty.

When Beningzen retired from Yankova, on the approach of Buonaparte, and sought to evade the enemy by forced marches in the dark nights of a Poland winter, although 90,000 men thundered on in close pursuit, the Russian murmur at retreat was so impressively audacious, the clamour for battle so loud and reiterated, the incipient disorder was so frightfully extending, that Beningzen was obliged to promise acquiescence to their demand ; and to soothe their discontents, by an assurance that he was marching to reach an appropriate theatre of combat. Gratified in this request, they fought six long days to secure the undisturbed march of six longer, more painful, and more terrific intervening nights ; but in which alarm,

of public inquiry ; and which by a short statement of facts may still be forced from its

anxiety, and disorder mingled to such a degree, and so shattered the military frame, that victory might have been achieved against them without the glory of a subdued resistance ; yet when this army, wearied, famished, and diminished by the loss of 10,000 men, entered at Eylau, their alignement for battle, order regenerated as with the British at Corunna : the memory of former glories, and the confidence of approaching victory cheered even the most exhausted ; and a spectator would have supposed that the joyous acclamations commemorated a success, instead of being an anticipation of the most sanguinary trial that was yet upon the records of this bloody war. Such was their vehement ardour to retrieve imaginary disgrace, and profit of a liberty to engage, that when in the evening before the battle, Benningzen ordered the village of Eylau, which had been abandoned by mistake, to be recovered, and the columns were in motion to the attack, animated by an expression in the command, " that the Emperor expected his troops to execute the orders," but afterwards thinking it advisable, as the enemy was greatly reinforced, to desist from the enterprize, he sent his officers to countermand the service, " No, no," exclaimed every voice ; the Emperor must not be disappointed." And they rushed forward, sheltering their gallant disobedience under the authority of an illusion created by their commander.

The desolating misery of a night passed without food, without any moisture to quench drought but

dark retreat, and dragged into open day, from whose light it shrinks with such unequivocal terror.

In the war which terminated in the peace of Tilsit, the emperor of Russia appeared only in the character of an ally, ready in conjunction with England to assist the weaker powers threatened by France ; the sudden disper-

the iced snow, without any shelter, without any covering but the rags of their garments, with bare and wounded feet, without fuel, without any consolation, and sleep interrupted by the groans of the dying, or preparations for action, not all this complicated bitterness of condition could humble the spirit or weaken the ardour of this illustrious host. Ere morning dawned they stood to their arms impatient for action ; and in that most memorable day established a reputation, which immortalized their courage, and greatly influenced the preservation of their army, when its reduced numbers were unequal, without such impression, to secure its protection. Their valour, indeed, on that day had accomplished the prayers of mankind, and Buonaparte had been on the next an hopeless fugitive, if Benningzen had yielded to the intreaties of every general in the field ; but although the fruits of victory were by that decision wrested from their possession, not Buonaparte, nor France, can pluck the laurel from their brows, which truth and time will to the latest hour preserve with undiminished verdure."

sion however of the Prussian armies, and the apathy of Austria who remained an indifferent spectator, drove the whole storm of war upon Russia, and her sovereign became, against his inclination and original intention, a principal in the contest for which he had not been prepared. It was certainly in his power to recede, since he wanted neither the tempting opportunity of doing so, nor a combination of circumstances to justify the step ; but the principle of honour was paramount to all other considerations, and he resolved on a strict and faithful adherence to those pre-existing engagements with England, which, though on her part yet to be fulfilled, it was repugnant to his feelings to doubt ; and which, he hoped, might yet inspire Austria with confidence, and rouse her into activity. Such were the sentiments, and such were the motives that determined Alexander to continue the war in which he had no immediate interest, and by declining which he might have spared much horror and bloodshed, and yet gained the same final advantages of additional security and protection to his frontiers.

But Alexander was deceived. The destinies of England were no longer in the same

hands ; and the illustrious son of Chatham was no more. The man, whose active genius was the shield of protection, and whose word was the rock of confidence and the rallying standard of the oppressed nations, was gone ; and with him public integrity, generosity, and honour, which bloomed on the brow of England, descended to the grave. His unostentatious firmness was succeeded by arrogant imbecility ; and his skill and experience gave place to a splendid pageantry of pretensions, which the first experiment dissolved into a mere noxious vapour. The restless demagogues, who clamoured during his laborious life, seized on his armour, even before the body that wore it was laid in the earth ; but they found it more ponderous than they expected, and staggered under its weight. They clothed themselves in his plumage : but a jackdaw could not be long concealed under the borrowed feathers of a peacock. They found that it was much easier to censure and declaim with vehemence, than govern and act with energy ; and that it was less difficult to command a “ keen encounter of tongues,” than to hurl the thunderbolt of destruction upon the foe, and direct a mighty conflict

between powerful nations. Instead of a supple and elastic body, which moved, contracted, or expanded, with a single effort, they brought one of monstrous size, disjointed, and so constructed, that one muscle hindered the motion of another, and each limb served a separate head. On the fading traces of a constellation, removed to another and a happier sphere, they came like fleeting, illusive meteors, which it would have been certain destruction to follow. In short, the men who at that time governed England, under the modest assumption of "all the talents," had neither candour to disavow their engagements, nor honesty to fulfil them ; neither boldness to proclaim their wishes and predilections, nor magnanimity to retract those wishes and subdue those predilections ; neither fear of the success of France, nor assurance of the effectual resistance of Russia ; neither sense and virtue to be just to others, nor policy and generosity to assist their friends, and thereby render justice to themselves.

To expect from men like these any efficient cooperation, or an honourable discharge of the obligations into which they solemnly entered, was perhaps the only weakness that could ex-

pose Alexander to censure ; for, through the flimsy texture of their promises, it was easy to perceive they never meant to perform them ; and that their first determination, on hearing of the fate of Prussia, was to abandon the field to France, and to throw no obstruction in the progress of her arms. In vain did the emperor of Russia remind them of what was expected from them. His applications and remonstrances were answered with soothing words, that meant nothing, and cost nothing ; or softened with the truly consoling presence of an agent,* who, instead of money, brought

* It was said with some reason, that Lord Hutchinson, encouraged by Mr. Windham, had really entertained a notion of being, at least virtually, commander in chief of the Russian forces ; and finding his very *moderate* expectation disappointed, and his bringing off the British troops from Egypt, (after Abercrombie's death had sealed their victory,) not considered by the *barbarous* Russians so great an exploit as he fondly imagined it, he grew morose, sullen, and but too well complied with the wishes of his ruling friends at home, in sending them despatches without a single white spot in them, and of so black a complexion, that it was deemed imprudent to publish them ; as in such case, it would have been necessary to produce the despatches of Sir Robert

with him pride enough to imagine himself the supreme dictator, and colours dark enough to paint things in the only light in which his employers wished them to appear. Like a boding raven, he hovered near the Russian troops ; and his croakings, though at variance with each succeeding event, were hailed at home with that unfeigned joy, which the mere

Wilson,* who was also with the Russian army ; and who, not having the honour of being one of the " talents," and therefore not keen or profound enough to see things differently from what they were, used much *less ink* in his compositions, than the depraved consistency of the party required. The whole of this conduct was so preposterous, so palpably unjust and impolitic, as to be generally believed ; for the greater its absurdity, the more it was palpable and characteristic of the party, possessing among other peculiarities an uncommon sagacity in the choice and appointment of agents and ministers, who, from the great Lord Hutchinson down to Mr. Erskine (the remaining twig of the talents) have always proved themselves of the *genuine stock*, and by their marvellous independent self-acting, and self-sufficient wisdom, have seldom failed to widen the breach which it was their duty to mend, and to irritate the wounds they were sent to heal.

* The author did not know that Sir Robert Wilson would publicly and in spite of all opposition, do justice to the Russian nation, by his history of the campaign in Poland.

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possibility of doubting the prowess of Russia was sure to inspire.

One battle followed another ; yet not a jot of the promised supplies was obtained by the emperor. Even when the chief object of his being so urgent was understood to be the relief of a distressed ally ; the same niggardly economy, the same ungenerous, penny-wise policy, was still pursued on the part of the British administration ; as if to exhibit a striking contrast between his disinterestedness and their meanness, between his noble perseverance and their sordid obstinancy.

They left nothing undone to probe his feelings to the utmost, and bring his magnanimity to the most desperate trial ; *still he remained faithful to their cause.*

Scorning the idea of subsidy, he, at length, applied for a loan of five millions sterling, offering ample securities for the payment of interest and principal ; and though he was refused, *still remained faithful to their cause.*

To the injury of refusal they added insult by pretending to grant the loan, but declining to be security to the British stockholders, who, of course, could not, without such security from their own government, gratify their own wishes by complying with those of the

emperor ; *still he remained faithful to the cause.*

In the attempt to relieve Dantzick, they prevented him from employing his ships, by promising to send their own, which promise not being performed, Dantzick, so important to future operations, fell into the hands of the French ; *still he remained faithful to the cause.*

Instead of making a descent on the coast of the Baltick, they thought of conquests for themselves ; and sent out their puny expeditions to Egypt and Constantinople, as if to convince the world, by a succession of ill luck, of their eagerness for political depravity, and of their want of ability to execute even their own schemes ; *still the emperor remained faithful to their cause.*

They suffered him to be lampooned, and laughed at his simplicity in fighting for no object at all ; *still he remained faithful to their cause.**

* It is highly gratifying to the feelings of the author that his uniform prediction of the Prince's not admitting these men to his confidence, have been verified. In excluding them the Prince Regent has evinced his consciousness of their shuffling policy and dishonourable conduct towards the Russian govern-

In the face of the world, in the august presence of parliament, they dared to plead the necessities of Russia in defence of their deserting her ; and to assume as the ground of such desertion, her being forced to fight in consequence of their “ bringing war to her door ;”† *still he remained faithful to their cause.*

By their withholding all assistance, and thereby extinguishing all hopes, till then indulged, of effectual cooperation from England, Prussia was not able to collect even the wrecks of her army ; and Austria, who by interposing her forces between France and Buonaparte, might have decided the fate of Europe, remained irresolute, and lost the only opportunity she ever had of recovering her

ment ; and has given a fair pledge of his disposition to do Russia justice whenever a fit opportunity should present itself.

† The speeches and sentiments of Mr. Whitbread, a prominent star in the “ talent” firmament. It is difficult to decide whether iniquity or folly was the parent of such sentiments ; for, on one hand, there was an unprincipled desertion of a friend in distress, by the very persons who had contributed to that distress ; on the other, there was an infatuation which blinded them as to the possibility of his relieving himself at their expense.

independence. In consequence of this the emperor of Russia found himself alone, and deserted by the very powers for whose particular interest he entered the lists with France ; *still he remained faithful to the cause.*

While he was shedding the dearest blood of his subjects, the ruling party in England had the cruelty of pretending to doubt the sincerity of his professions, and the hardihood to disregard the strongest proofs that can be given by a sovereign loving his people ; *still he remained faithful to their cause.*

Buonaparte, possessing all the wisdom they wanted, and much more, perceived at once the situation of Alexander ; and finding his own invincibles sufficiently feasted on hard blows, professed his friendship for Russia, disclaimed every purpose of hostility, sought every opportunity of reconciliation, urged the criminal duplicity and selfishness of the British administration, and the self-immolating indifference of Austria, offered even a share of his conquests,* and, in short, exerted all his

* It is certain that Buonaparte offered to Russia all the country eastward of the Vistula ; but Alexander declined it, and accepted a small portion merely for the sake of a more regular boundary.

Sir R. Wilson, though an English officer, writing

means, and they were great, to detach Russia from a cause so unprofitable and hopeless : still the Russian emperor hesitated to comply, still he would have persisted in his sacrifices ; but at this time he had arrived at a point beyond which patience was a crime, and perseverance nothing less than treason against his people. He therefore yielded ; and at Tilsitz concluded that peace, which in justice to his own interests ought to have been made much sooner.

Then it was, that “ all the talents” were confounded and astonished, exclaiming, with a vacant stare, “ who would have thought it ?” * Then it was that the people awoke

at the time of war between his country and Russia, has the following remark on the peace of Tilsitz.

“ If it were permitted to detail the political history of the preceding immediate causes which occasioned the treaty of Tilsitz, and the emperor’s conduct on that occasion, the sentiment of resentment would be driven from every English breast. Never was a prince, until that fatal moment, more honest, more loyal, more devoted to the common cause :—Never did a prince struggle with greater difficulties to direct perseverance ; and when he yielded, he yielded only in the hope of serving his country.”

* Mr. Sheridan on a former occasion related story, which he little expected would so soon apply

from their lethargy, drove these pretenders from their seats, and filled them with men who talked less but performed more, and who, by coming in one month sooner, might have yet preserved the friendship of Russia.

But, though this change of men and measures came too late to retrieve the mischief, it was not too late to call its authors to an account. In vain the great Lord Hutchinson committed a breach of confidence by disclosing the private conversations he had with the emperor Alexander. His own vanity was gratified in being known to have conversed with an emperor ; but his friends were ill served, and driven to extremity. Bad was made worse, and they had to choose between humiliating confession and open dereliction of principle ; which last, having dared already to boast of it, their pride induced them to maintain to his own political friends. A good housewife, he said, to prevent a cat from doing mischief, shut the poor grimalkin in a closet full of china and various dainties ; and when, on opening the closet, she found her fine china scattered in fragments, and the dainties some gone, and some polluted with " touch impure," she was petrified with grief and horror : her arms were extended, her eyes rolled wild, and she at length exclaimed : " who would have thought it ?"

tain without hesitation. They nobly resolved to shift all blame upon Russia, to call her constancy *vacillation of policy*, and to defend their own conduct on the ground that Russia had neither strength, means, nor skill to resist France ; and that they, foreseeing her certain defeat, like *honest patriots and wise statesmen*, thought it was best to keep the promised sums at home.

However, as the three successive battles of Pultusk, Eylau, and Friedland, the most bloody, protracted, and obstinate the French ever fought, stared the plotting junto in the face, and proved to the world that Russia wanted neither strength, means, nor skill ; and as the terrible defeats foretold by these inspired seers had not yet taken place, they set about to disprove facts by speculations, and to convince, whom they could, that what has happened *ought not to have happened*. But even in this they had not the merit of originality ; for Voltaire, in his tale of Zadig, had long ago introduced a certain quack personage, who finding that, contrary to his prediction, Zadig recovered one of his eyes, wrote a large volume to prove that the patient *ought certainly to have lost it !*

The separate peace, which Russia made with France, they tried to convert into a measure brought on by wavering policy, and enforced by fear and necessity ; whereas they well knew it to be their own work from letters received in London long before the battle of Friedland, in which letters the departure of Alexander for the army, and the probable event of peace, in consequence of their own neglect and equivocation, were commented upon, and foreseen with more certainty than what was found in their own gloomy prophecies of the fall of Russia. From the emperor's requiring their aid and assistance, they endeavoured to establish the conclusion, that they were right in supposing Russia destitute of resources, and unable to resist the enemy ; but they took good care not to explain, that the emperor required, what was in some measure his due ; that he was not acting in his own defence ; and neither surprise had allowed him time for preparation, nor the foreign interest, for which he took up arms, made it wise or just to waste his internal resources.

In short, they set every engine in motion to coin the basest metal into their defence. Pamphleteers, newsmongers, editors, travel-

lers, agents, reviewers, and whomsoever they could press into their service, were sent to hunt in every direction and every corner, from the palace to the cottage, for any thing, ever so trifling, which might vilify the moral and physical character of the Russian nation, fix on its sovereign the stigma of dishonest policy, and support the doctrine of its political impotence. Nay, with eagerness which betrays itself, they went so far as, through some of their mouth pieces,* openly to insult the bleeding victims of French oppression with an insinuation, that it is much better to be enslaved, prostrated, trampled upon by France, than to hope or seek for consolation and deliverance in the suspended, but not yet palsied, efforts of Russia.

I must dismiss the disagreeable subject, as I cannot, I own, even at this distance of time, treat it with becoming temper ; I will, therefore, proceed to the next, *of foreign influence and corruption.*

* *Vide* the concluding part of the Review of Dr. Clarke's "Travels in Russia" in the Edinburgh Review.

Sir R. Wilson positively denies all the infamous and libellous charges against the Russian nation, detailed by Dr. Clarke, and backed by the Edinburgh Reviewers.

Fears and apprehensions on this score are not only exaggerated, but appear to me totally groundless. Foreign influence and corruption, and their offspring treason, have visited every country ; yet that such visitors were ever treated with more welcome in Russia, than in any other country, is an opinion not supported by facts and experience. Ever since the time of Peter the Great, who had established the government on a solid foundation, traitors have been scarce and harmless in Russia. The so-much-dreaded French influence, which carries deadly corruption on its tongue, has not yet reached her ; for, what appears influence at present is only the common effect of peace, caused by the preceding enmity of that faction, which had unfortunately governed Great-Britain. During the last and the former contest with France, some instances of mismanagement may have appeared ; but not a single one of treachery ; which, until it is established, cannot be without flagrant injustice imputed to any of the Russian subjects.

The truth is, that in Russia, while the power of the sovereign is more than sufficient at any time to crush treason in the shell, and

while the motives to cherish foreign influence and corruption are as few as in any country whatever ; the means of spreading such influence and corruption are very difficult, and, I may say, impracticable. There are no political parties, no factions to agitate the mass of the people, or give to the public mind any general impulse inconsistent with the interest of government, which is always the interest of the country, both being permanently united. Nor is there the least chance of success in propagating any specious doctrines, pregnant with latent mischief, through some surreptitious means or underhand channel ; for no press can be hired to publish treason, no hands can be found to distribute its poison, and, if the vigilance of government should be so far baffled by a kind of miracle, the people at large will neither read nor understand the jargon submitted to them. The Russian peasantry would laugh at the French rhapsodies, which have misled and ruined so many nations ; I say *they would laugh*, because they have actually done so, whenever a few partial attempts have been made to seduce them from their allegiance. The sword is the only weapon which can be used in penetrating into Russia.

The two most important departments, civil and military, where influence and corruption are most to be dreaded, are chiefly in the hands of the nobles and the sons of clergy. The former enjoy so many immunities, such legitimate influence, and such vast possessions, that, independent of family pride and domestic partialities, their very interest, being identified with that of the sovereign and country, makes them proper and safe guardians of national welfare. Their yielding to corruption would be digging a grave for themselves, and inviting the first murderous blow of treason to their own heart. Accordingly, they have always been ready to shed their blood in the preservation of their country ; and in the records of history they have always filled the first rank among the Russian patriots. Any peculiarity, or difference of political sentiment, which may have induced them to act under the appearance of some secret foreign influence, has nothing in common with corruption ; and only shews that freedom, of which they cannot be easily deprived, and which strangers affect to discredit ; but which nevertheless is actually enjoyed under the monarchical government of Russia.

The clergy, as a distinct body, share with the nobility some of the most important privileges, such as exemption from taxes, and from all the burthens of military service, and also a right to be judged in criminal cases by their peers in the ecclesiastical court ; but their sons, who are employed in the most laborious and important offices under government, besides the rights inherited from their fathers, have the prospect of nobility before them. Their education in colleges, and afterwards in universities, confers on them personal nobility, and if they do not choose to return to the profession of their fathers, a few years of faithful service and irreproachable conduct makes their nobility hereditary, and opens the way, on a level with the most ancient and exalted families, to the highest trusts, dignities, and honours in the empire. This class, which has the greatest share of talent and youthful activity, has also the greatest losses to fear, the greatest advantages to gain, and the strongest excitements of ambition to be honest ; and, therefore, being triply fortified, is inaccessible to corruption.

Nor are the other classes debarred from all these advantages, provided they are inclined to

enter the service, and had received an education to qualify them for these honours. It is the happy feature of the Russian government, enforced and perpetuated by the immortal example of Peter the Great, that the nobility, though entitled to all their special and individual privileges, are excluded from official precedence, unless they obtain it, like the rest, by personal merit or service ; so that the son of a clergyman, merchant, or even a peasant,* by a higher advancement in office, obtains a positive preeminence over the son of a nobleman ; and a prince or a count, both in military and civil service, is often placed under the immediate command of a person of low origin. This produces an equality of chances and advantages, in the preservation of which all ranks, more or less, are interested and united.

The Russian merchant, though enjoying many important privileges, gives himself up to trade and industry, and never meddles in politics. A shield of national prejudice guards him from all foreign influence and corruption ; and he is thrown into the mass of

* A serf becomes free the moment he enters the service, and the road of honour is open to him on an equality with the rest.

population, which, besides the same prejudice, has loyalty interwoven with its very nature, habits, and religion.

That class of peasantry, which Europeans call slaves, and on whose impatience they calculate the enemy's success, are not numerous nor important enough to endanger the safety of the empire, even were they inclined to do so ; but they view their own happiness without borrowing the eyes of strangers, and have in no instance as yet failed in loyalty, or appeared inferior to other classes in their attachment. The glorious little band, which had saved Russia under Pojarsky and Minin, as has been stated in a preceding page, was chiefly composed of this class of men. They have, at all times, furnished the bravest and the best soldiers for the Russian army—soldiers, who, according to the enemy's own account, when prostrated on the field of battle, and while a single spark of life is remaining in them, always, before they expire, cast a lingering look of farewell towards their beloved country.*

* Sir R. Wilson says : "Amidst the Russian qualities, the love of country is also pre-eminent, and inseparable from the Russian soldier. This feeling is paramount, and in the very last hour his gaze is direct-

Even the Polish peasantry of the same condition, and so lately subjected, have completely disappointed the views of Buonaparte, whose public proclamations, preceding the last war, prove how much, and how prematurely, he had relied on their co-operation.

From men so devoted, what cannot be expected, when their unchangeable loyalty is further strengthened by uncommon love and attachment to the person of Alexander, who like a benignant deity smiles upon them, and by sure and gradual steps leads them all to the temple of freedom ?†

ed towards its nearest confines. The wounded drag their mangled bodies over the field to expire with more satisfaction in the effort of approaching them."

† It was reserved for this truly benevolent prince to complete the happiness of Russia by devising a plan, which in a short time will emancipate every portion of its population. He has caused a considerable fund to be laid apart and augmented every year from the general revenue, for the sole purpose of taking on mortgage and redeeming the estates with peasantry ; and of purchasing such as are offered for sale, by means of agents established for that end in every province of the empire. The success has answered the most sanguine expectations ; and several hundreds of thousands have already been emancipated, and restored to their proper rank in society.

In short, among the causes which may operate against Russia, foreign influence and corruption, which to be effectual must be extensive, are the least to be feared ; while on the opposite side, she has many sources yet unexplored, and perhaps unsuspected. It is probable, that the extremity of distress would only make Russia better acquainted with her own strength ; at all events, she is certain of commanding all that invincible force, which enthusiasm can impart and exalted patriotism can inspire.

During the last war, no sooner had the government proclaimed the project of raising militia, than 600,000 men were immediately enlisted and equipped for the field. The nobles set the first example, and the ardour thereby excited in all the ranks was incredible. The spirit of emulation removed all distinction between the prince and the peasant ; and conferred it only on those, who made the greatest sacrifices. For two or three years afterwards, the public papers teemed with the names of those patriots, who had contributed

their mite to the common stock. Some gave all their personal effects, and some disposed of their houses, in order to enlist and maintain their new character; while others parted with all they possessed in order to bring the produce into the public fund which was raising for the support of this new race of warriors. Instances occurred of gentlemen selling their whole estates, that they might raise whole regiments at their own expense, and, at the head of them, present themselves to the delighted eye of their monarch. After this, it would be an insult to suspect among the nobles, or any other class of the Russian people, the existence of foreign influence and corruption.

With regard to *the defects of the military system of Russia*, I know not on what ground this opinion has been permitted to prevail; or why the successes of Russia have been overlooked and forgotten, as if they were merely accidental; and her failures uniformly attributed to some permanent defects in her military system, such as want of skill in officers and discipline in soldiers.

While other European nations, who have opposed France with much less effect, and have been crippled and ruined, still were al-

lowed to retain, in the public estimation, their original military character ; Russia alone, after sustaining several contests without being either crippled or ruined, cannot, it seems, lose a battle, or a single inch of ground, without losing at the same time her military fame, and exciting distrust as to the skill of her officers and the discipline of her soldiers. If the French are beaten, it is considered as the effect of accident ; but if the Russians fail, they are instantly deprived of all the indulgence, which might be claimed from the unforeseen operation of chance.

An army, equal and even inferior in skill and discipline, may beat another, better equipped, merely by the temporary superiority of its general and the adventitious aid of numbers, without depriving, however, the vanquished of the credit due to them ; yet, with regard to the Russians, no allowance is made in this respect, though it is well known that the French, whenever they opposed them, had the double advantage of an able and experienced general, and of numbers greatly superior. If Massena at the head of a French army engaged Buonaparte at the head of another French army, and either of them were defeated, as both could not be vic-

torious; the comment would be, that the conqueror was a better general or had a superior force, or that both were in his favour; and none would say, that the beaten army wanted good officers and discipline; why then the reverses of the Russians, under similar circumstances, should be viewed in a different and less favourable light, appears to me a manifest injustice, and mysterious, incomprehensible infatuation.

In all the sanguinary battles, which took place in Poland, the Russians were decidedly inferior in numbers, and their general was by no means equal in reputation to Buonaparte. Moreover, they fought fair, breast to breast, and face to face, in an open field, without any local advantages to counterbalance the disadvantages under which they laboured—to speak more technically, they fought general engagements or regular pitched battles, one after another, and upon the largest possible scale; yet, far from being dispersed, routed, or disabled from action, they firmly maintained their ground, and whenever it was necessary, retreated in perfect order,—retreated before a veteran and more numerous army, commanded by Buonaparte and the greatest generals of

the age ! How could the Russians have done this, if they had not skilful officers to command every movement, and execute every order with promptitude and habitual intelligence ? If they did want such officers and good discipline, in addition to all other disadvantages ; then Napoleon, his generals, and his army, are not deserving half the credit given them ; for they ought, in an instant, to have annihilated their weak adversaries. But if Napoleon, his generals, and his army, be fairly entitled, and I think they are so, to all their fame and renown ; then the Russians, who could oppose them with such well directed efforts, and with such well regulated bravery could fight in retreating, and, for a series of days, disputing every inch of ground with the enemy, without the least disorder or any other loss than was occasioned by death, must have had officers and discipline of no ordinary kind, but such as were grown with years, and matured by experience ; such in short, as cannot be easily arrested in their progress, and must continue unimpaired by any temporary or accidental advantages of the enemy.

The first attempt of the first regular Russian army failed at the battle of Narva ; but

Peter the Great, who had formed that army, soon placed it on a foundation not to be easily shaken. The very men, who had thus fled at the sight of an enemy, in a short time were able to face him, and beat him upon equal terms. The Swedish general *Schlippenback* in Livonia, and another Swedish general, *Crooniort*, in Finland, only two years after, were each defeated with a terrible loss in a pitched battle ; and were the first to feel the valour of the Russians, directed by skill and discipline. At the action of *Czarnapata*, prince Galitzin, with only 8 battalions and 13 squadrons, completely defeated and routed a Swedish force of 5000 men, commanded by general Rosen, and the best in the king's army. At the battle of *Lezno*, Peter the Great, who commanded in person, with 10 regiments of horse and 10 battalions of foot, attacked, routed, and took 20 Swedish regiments, amounting in all to 16,000 men, whom general Lewenhaupt was leading to the king's assistance : the general himself, and about 50 men more, were all that escaped. At the memorable battle of *Poltava*, where the Russian force was divided into three lines, so as to form a kind of reserve to

each other, the first line of foot, 10,000 men strong, was the only one engaged in the main action, and had the honour of defeating a most formidable enemy, before it was necessary to bring the rest to its assistance ; a wonderful progress of skill and discipline* in nine years,

* The following anecdote will further convince us of the loyalty and discipline of the Russian soldier. Peter the Great, at an interview with the kings of Denmark and Poland, hearing them boast of the superiority of their soldiers, instead of disputing the point with them, proposed an experiment which was immediately assented to, and which was, to order a grenadier to jump out of a third floor window. The king of Denmark tried the experiment on one of his bravest and most loyal soldiers, who on his knee refused compliance. The king of Poland waved the trial altogether, conceiving it to be hopeless ; when Peter ordered one of his soldiers, the least promising that could be picked out, to descend the window. The soldier merely crossed himself, touched his hat according to form, boldly marched to the window, and had already one of his legs out, when the emperor stopped him, and told him he was satisfied. The kings were astonished, and each made the soldier a present of 100 ducats, requesting Peter to promote him to the rank of an officer. The czar answered, that he would do so to oblige them, but not to reward the soldier ; for all his soldiers would do as much, and by rewarding them in the same way he would have no soldiers left.

and perfectly authenticated by the official account of that battle.

The same progress was visible at sea ; for the first regular fleet which Peter had built, and fitted out under his own command, attacked a Swedish fleet commanded by vice-admiral Ehrenchiöld ; and, though the Swedes were much older sailors, their metal heavier, and their commander an officer of great skill and experience, they were completely defeated, most of their ships taken, and the admiral himself made prisoner.

Was all this the effect of chance ? Has the art of war, since that time, been less cultivated by the Russians ? Or has their military character degenerated ? Frederick the Great, and the inhabitants of Berlin, who saw the Russian eagles planted on their ramparts, can testify to the contrary. The young tree, planted by the care and genius of Peter, had a soil too congenial and well chosen not to thrive. It has cast a deep root, and is still in its vigour ; and though the storm may bend it, and the frost may strip it of its leaves, the chilling hand of decay has not yet touched it.

I will pass the victories over the Turks and Poles, and bring Russia into contact with

France, the terror and the scourge of the present age.

From the year 1799, when the contest first began between France and Russia, to the treaty of Tilsitz, there had been seven great, regular, or pitched battles, fought in Italy, Switzerland, Germany, and Poland, and with what success may be seen from the following comparative statement.

IN FAVOUR OF RUSSIA.

IN FAVOUR OF FRANCE.

The decisive battle of Cassano, where the French under Moreau were defeated by Suwarow.

The battle of Zurich, under Massena, decisive, and destructive to the Russians, who were commanded by Korsakoff.

The battle of Trebia, fought by the same general, which lasted three days, and terminated in the total destruction of the enemy, commanded by Macdonald.

None.

The battle of Novi, the most bloody and obstinate in Italy, which finally ended in the decisive victory of Suwarow over the French generals Joubert and Moreau.

None.

The battle of Pultusk, where general Beningen repulsed Buonaparte with great loss.

The battle of Austerlitz, in which the Russians attacked Buonaparte ; but were driven back with loss, though they still kept their first position.

The horrid, sanguinary battle of Eylau, where Beningsen commanded, and which, for its obstinacy, slaughter, and a series of bloody actions, that for fourteen days preceded it, has no parallel in the history of modern warfare. It completely arrested the progress of the French, and, in spite of Buonaparte, drove them back into winter quarters.

The battle of Friedland, in which, after fighting for sixteen days incessantly, Buonaparte succeeded in driving the Russians from their positions ; and gained ground without any other advantage than the possession of Konigsberg.

The bloody battle of Heilsberg, where the French under Buonaparte were repulsed with great slaughter.

None.

From this statement, of the correctness of which any one may judge, the events being within his memory, there is a clear balance of three battles in favour of the Russians ; and a

general balance of decisive and destructive termination of their victories. It also appears that, even in carrying on an offensive war, the Russians with Suwarow and equal numbers, were more successful over the French, than the French with Buonaparte and superior numbers were over the Russians. But when all minor actions are considered, in which the Russians had generally the advantage, such for instance as the exploit of prince Bagration, who, before the battle of Austerlitz, while the Russian army was retreating, with six thousand men, and in sight of Napoleon, cut his way through a French army : and, above all, when we reflect on the unprecedented passage of Suwarow over the Alps, which, from his first entrance into Switzerland to his quitting it,* was a constant chain of brilliant achieve-

* The Austrian army, under the Archduke Charles, in Switzerland, which, in conjunction with the Russians whom Suwarow was coming to take under his command, kept Massena in check, was ordered to withdraw ; and the Russians, left to the mercy of the enemy, more than double in numbers, were attacked and defeated. The victorious enemy then turned his main forces upon Suwarow, cut off his communication with the fugitives, and surrounded him on all sides. No alternative remained apparently, but to

ments, and an uninterrupted series of splendid triumphs over the foe, over the perfidy of surrender at discretion, or starve by famine. The enemy already made sure of his prey. At one time, Suwarow was represented to fight as a *devil*, (Vide Massena's bulletins to the Directory ;) at another, to have lost the whole of his army (which, indeed, was scarcely equal to one fourth of the enemy's force,) in killed and prisoners, being himself among the latter. But Suwarow was no ordinary being. With a handful of men, who thought nothing impossible under their general, and who by death alone could be parted from him, he forced his way sword in hand, and led his victorious few through the hostile ranks that vainly opposed them. The enemy, who the moment before, confident in his numbers, was boastingly anticipating the fall of Suwarow, was defeated, and, by yielding four thousand prisoners, added one more to the already numerous trophies of the aged hero. This action, the last, but perhaps the most splendid of all the preceding, closed the long and brilliant career of the illustrious Veteran, and secured him the title of "Invincible," due to him in the strictest sense of the word, for he never lost a battle. It is but justice to acknowledge here, that Suwarow acquitted the Archduke Charles of any ill intention or equivocal conduct towards the Russians, well knowing that the Archduke could not have withdrawn his forces so prematurely from Switzerland, and exposed them to a defeat, without previous orders from his Cabinet ; it being the established rule

an ally, and over nature herself; the balance in favour of Russia will be prodigiously increas-

with the Austrian government, a most preposterous and fatal rule to her interests, that no commander in chief can resolve upon any measure of importance, though on actual service, and at a distance from home, without receiving orders for that purpose, from the Council of war at Vienna! Suwarow was only five days' march from the Russian army, which was defeated in Switzerland. Had the Austrians therefore waited only five days longer, he would have effected a junction with it, and Massena would have shared the fate of the French generals in Italy.

Sir Robert Wilson thus speaks of the Russian Veteran :

“ Suwarow was affectionately endeared to every soldier as his parent; and national pride and personal admiration have deified him as the still presiding god of their battles.

An acquaintance with the composition of his armies, a knowledge of their insignificant numerical strength,* the assurance of the internal impediments that he had to encounter, certainly so augment the merit of his exploits, that he is entitled to the reputation of one of the first captains that ever appeared. His very eccentricities were characteristic of his superiority of intelligence. They affected his estima-

* Never exceeding 35,000, although operations were conducted on the scale for 70,000; and the court proclaimed, and the public believed the existence of that force.

ed ; and though she may be now depressed by being deprived of her best general, while France is raised by possessing her's, the assurance will still be sufficient to console us, that, if Suwarow could not conquer France, Napoleon cannot conquer Russia ; that the latter on her own territory is, like the former, invincible ; and that a single genius may produce many important changes, without their being connected with any difference or permanent defects in the military system of either. It is impossible to repel this assurance amongst superficial observers ; but he disdained the sneer of the less enlightened, and steadily persevered in the course that his wisdom had traced for the attainment of his patriotic ambition. Such was their enthusiastic affection for him, that when the coffin, in which his body was conveyed into the church of the citadel to be deposited near the remains of the great Catherine, fixed in the door-way, and instruments were ordered to wrench a passage—one of the grenadier bearers, indignant at the check, exclaimed—“ What is all this ? *Nothing* could resist Suwarow *living*, and *nothing* shall stop him *dead*.” The sentiment was hailed as a just tribute to the invincible character of their chief. *That* consciousness supplied strength to zeal, and the remains of Suwarow were forced triumphant to the grave !”

while we behold Spain and Portugal with no government, no resources, and no regular force but what their ally furnishes them, successfully defying the utmost efforts of gigantic France.

The last campaign in Poland, distressing as it was to the French, is nothing to what they must experience, if they dare again to invade it. At that time the sudden overthrow of Prussia enabled them to seize on many fine and fertile provinces, which furnished them with necessary supplies ; but which are now exhausted, or will be prevented from furnishing any. The more men Buonaparte brings with him, and the farther he penetrates into Russia, the nearer he will draw to the fate of Charles XII. Again the Russian peasants will be removed, again their habitations will be destroyed, and again whole fertile regions will be, for safety, converted by the Russians into a barren wilderness. The French, if they advance, will see nothing but the Russian bayonets bristling in front, and receding only to strike with surer aim ; nothing but fugi-

tive Cozaks* hanging on their wings, who, used to this distressing mode of warfare, will

* The name *Cozaks* is general, and applied to all those tribes, which follow the same irregular and almost optional method of warfare. The particular bodies of the Cozaks are distinguished from each other, not so much by the different nations which compose them, as by the places they respectively inhabit. Thus the *Don-Cozaks* take their name from the river Don; the *Ouralian Cozaks*, from the Ouralian mountains; the *Cozaks of the Ukraine*, from the name of the country; and the *Zaporavian Cozaks*, from the cataracts of the Dnieper, as the word *Zaporavian*, or more properly *Zaporostzi*, signifies in the Russian language, "people living beyond the Cataracts." The two former are chiefly the colonists of great Russia, and the two latter are formed of Malo-Russians; these wear no beards. The Zaporavians shave even their heads, and leave only a small piece of hair upon the crown, long enough to reach the nose, priding themselves upon every thing opposite to civilization, and to the common feelings of man. There was a time, when no woman whatever was permitted to live in their society; and though they began lately to have more intercourse with the sex, still they retained strongly the marks of their former ferocity; and might be called with great propriety, a gang of desperate outlaws, of robbers, and all sorts of public offenders, who were suffered to exist merely on account of the mischief they did

harass them by day and night ; and nothing behind or around them but sterility, famine, and desolation.

The French soldiers feel this ; Buonaparte knows it too, and hence is his delay ; for Rus-

to the enemy. They are now abolished, or sunk into the more civilized race of *Tchernomorskie Cozackie*.

The *Cozaks of the Ukraine*, and the *Don-Cozaks*, are more advanced in civilization ; the latter are seen sometimes with and sometimes without beards ; but the former exist now merely in name, applied indiscriminately to all the inhabitants. There are also *Cozaks* formed into regular regiments, but of these we need not speak. Excepting the *Cozaks of the Ukraine*, and the *Zaporavians*, the Tartars and Calmuks are so interspersed with all other *Cozaks*, as to form the most conspicuous and prominent feature in them. The Calmuks seem to be the real descendants of the ancient Scythians, who dwelt on the borders of the Don (Tanais.) Their features are broad and flat, with a pair of small, fiery, and piercing eyes. They are of small stature, very robust and active, and expert in the use of the bow and arrow, which they to this moment manage with astonishing dexterity. They are extremely skilful in taming wild horses, and are hired expressly for that purpose by the horse-contractors for the army, who have to choose these animals out of the wild studs bred chiefly by the land proprietors in Little Russia. A Calmuk rides into the midst of these ungovernable creatures, and after a horse is singled out, which

sia has taken a decisive stand against him, ever since she refused to adopt his conti-

is to be taken, he throws a loop round his neck with such expertness, that, though the distance is considerable, as the ferocious animal will not suffer any one to approach near him, he seldom misses his aim. No sooner does the loop fall upon the horse's neck, than the Calmuk fastens with amazing rapidity the other end of the rope to the saddle he sits upon, in such a manner as to prevent all possibility of the horse's escaping. The unruly savage, thus surprised, struggles hard, but the other horse, which the Calmuk rides, takes such a position by the direction of the rider, that the strength of the captive is exhausted, and he, at length, suffers himself to be led away, and is soon tamed. The Tartars, who are like Calmuks in their persons, are so intermixed with them as to be seen every where together. They eat horse flesh, without any other preparation than the warming it under the saddle they ride upon. For this reason, they have in general two or three horses with them; so that their provisions and the means of travelling proceed with them without any incumbrance. Both these nations or tribes are extremely numerous among the Don-Cozaks; and all together form those terrible warriors, whose aspect alone is sufficient to dismay an enemy not accustomed to such a sight.

The Cozaks are a valuable appendage to a regular army; they are its guides and satellites. It is their particular business to obtain intelligence from the enemy, which they do sometimes in the manner that a

mental system, the darling child of his ambition, and the constant object of his dreams and

Calmuk takes a wild horse. As soon as a Cozak comes near enough to the object of his search, he throws a loop round his waist, fastens it to his saddle, and gallops off with the prisoner. All the outposts are formed chiefly of the Cozaks. They are constantly upon the look-out, and cut a conspicuous figure in skirmishes. The lucre of gain, or the prospect of booty, is the main spring of their actions ; and a Cozak will seldom flinch from attacking two opponents, if he sees the probability of plunder. Their chief and most destructive weapon is a long lance, suspended upon a sling from the waist. When they are upon the attack, they let the lance down to a level with the stirrup horizontally, and, after drawing it back with the right foot, to which the butt-end is fastened, they hurl it forward by the same foot, with such force and destructive aim, that it generally proves fatal to the enemy. They are, besides, armed with a gun, a brace of pistols, and a sword, something in the shape of a Turkish sabre. Though in their military appearance they preserve a certain degree of uniformity, still their dress, according to their fancy or means, makes the scene, whenever they march in a body, chequered and truly grotesque. Though they are irregular troops, still they have a certain order, a certain principle of rude discipline, with officers regularly appointed and obeyed. Their horses are so diminutive and apparently weak, that they seem more calculated to be carried than to car-

visions. His character is too well known to suppose he would not have long ago marched
ry ; yet a Cozak, whether through prejudice or real conviction of their excellence, never will, never was known to part with his horse, nor exchange it for one ever so valuable, unless it is of the same breed. These horses are a race altogether anomalous, for whether fed luxuriously, or sparingly, they maintain invariably the same niggardly appearance, and, like the Russian soldier, can exist almost upon nothing, which may perhaps account for the Cozaks' attachment to them. Such is the thirst of Cozaks for war, that when the number required is inconsiderable, and they must cast lots who shall go, a serious quarrel is frequently the consequence of not being included in the number. He that returns home without booty, or has not been in action, is viewed by the women in a despicable light ; so that their manners and mode of living all tend to make them warriors. They think it charity to kill their own comrades, when wounded past recovery, or likely to fall into the hands of a merciless enemy. They disperse in such small parties, that it is almost impossible to stop their incursions, and for this reason they are the most dangerous set of men that can enter a hostile country. Nor are they less so to a routed enemy ; for, though they do not fight in the line, they are the first in pursuit, and the last in desisting from it. They performed wonders in Italy, under the command of Suwarow ; who knew, better than any other Russian general, how to employ them to the best advantage.

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his myrmidons against Russia, if he were not somewhat deterred by the hazard of the un-

Their officers have lately received a regular pay ; but the men are only paid during actual service.

The following description of the Cozaks is from Sir R. Wilson's Campaign in Poland.—

“The Cozaks of the Don and the Volga still preserve a constitutional independence, which is possessed by none of the other provinces of Russia. Regulated by their own laws, exempt from taxes, and governed under the immediate authority of their own Attaman, or chief, chosen from amongst themselves, they are relieved from all impositions of conquest, but the obligation for every male to serve gratuitously for five years with the Russian armies, and some interior services connected with their own police. Blessed with a country of rich plains and noble rivers, which nature covers with the glorious canopy of a fine climate, and fills with redundant food, the Cozak still maintains his warlike character, and unites with the most enthusiastic admiration of his country, and a disposition to profit of its enjoyments, the ambition of martial service, and an errant spirit of adventurous and foreign enterprize. In the land which gave him birth he is the peaceful and civilized inhabitant, natural in his affections, and domestic in his habits ; but in other countries he is the lawless Scythian, respecting no property or rights.

Proud of his national comparative freedom, he bears himself as one conscious of superiority and

dertaking. The policy of Russia, on this occasion, seems replete with wisdom. While

privilege, and yet he tempers the haughty sense of these advantages with an Asiatic grace of manner that renders the expression inoffensive to his associates and grateful to the stranger.

In the qualities of private character, the Cozak is to no man inferior—affectionate to his family ; faithful to his friend ; hospitable to the stranger, and generous to the distressed ; with graceful simplicity of manners, and a candour that commands confidence. His military virtues are splendid in common with the Russian nation ; but hereditary habits of war, and perhaps a natural talent for that species of it in which they are engaged, adds an acute intelligence and capacity that is not generally shared. By the stars, the wind, and an union of the most ingenious observations, he travels over countries unknown to him, through forests almost impervious, and reaches his destination ; or tracks some precursor, that he is directed to pursue, with the assurance and the indefatigable ardour of the instinctive blood-hound. Nothing can elude his activity, escape his penetration, or surprize his vigilance. Irreparable disgrace would dishonour the Cozak, whose negligence offered an advantage to the enemy. The crimes of the passions, cowardice itself would not attach so fatal a stigma ; for, in the words of their Attaman, “ This offence would not only sacrifice the army to the swords of the enemy, but entail a reproach on all, and distrust of all, that no valour or service could retrieve.” And such is the general impression of its

she is conscious of her own strength, she leaves to him the choice of war, and preserves for herself the incalculable advantage of not base character that no instance of a surprise is on record.

Mounted on a very little, ill-conditioned, but well-bred horse, which can walk at the rate of five miles an hour with ease, or, in his speed, dispute the race with the swiftest—with a short whip on his wrist (as he wears no spur)—armed with the lance, a pistol in his girdle, and a sword, he never fears a competitor in single combat ; but in the late war he irresistibly attacked every opposing squadron in the field. Terror preceded his charge, and in vain discipline endeavoured to present an impediment to the protruding pikes. The Cuirassiers alone preserved some confidence, and appeared to baffle the arm and the skill of the Cozak ; but in the battle of Pruess Eylau, when the Cuirassiers made their desperate charge on the Russian centre, and passed through an interval, the Cozaks instantly bore down on them, speared them, unhorsed them and, in a few moments, five hundred and thirty Cozaks re-appeared in the field equipped with the spoil of the slain.

When Murat, after the battle of Eylau, advanced with the French cavalry to menace the Russians, and induce Beningzen to evacuate Königsberg, the Cozaks attacked his posts in every direction, killed a very considerable number, and made prisoners, in the course of the succeeding 16 days, of 1,600 dragoons and hussars, which loss obliged Murat to re-

appearing the aggressor, but of appealing, with a resistless voice, to her people in self-tire, and Buonaparte to abandon Eylau and the open country in front of Guttstadt. They afterwards, in the Russian retreat, (being supported by some squadrons of regular cavalry,) made such desperate attacks, that Buonaparte was obliged to form squares with his infantry, and was himself in such danger that the whole French cavalry was brought down in full gallop to cover him.

It was in this retreat that their Attaman Platow evinced a trait of that superior mind which attained his station, and which, if he had received a liberal education, would have rendered him one of the first men of the age, as indisputably he is one of the most eminent warriors. After Buonaparte had brought up a second corps of his army, supported by the whole body, he advanced with rapidity, resolved to overwhelm the rear guards of Platow and Bragation, before they passed the bridges of the river, which flowed behind them, and to which they had to descend.

The Cozaks saw the impending danger, and began to press back in confusion. Platow checked, but found the disorder increasing. He immediately sprang from his horse, exclaiming to the Cozaks, "Let those, who are base enough, abandon their Attaman." The corrected lines paused. He gradually moved ; with a waving hand kept back those who trespassed ; sent his orders with calmness ; reached the town in order ; halted at the bridge until every man had passed, destroyed it, and still on foot, pro-

defence, and in revenge of that violation of sacred engagements which France in attacking her must necessarily commit. Whether Rus-

ceeded on the other side of the town, struggling above ankle deep through the heavy sand ; nor could the most tremendous cannonade, and the incessant fire of the French battalions, crowning the opposite heights, and who commenced their volleys as they formed successively, accelerate his pace, or induce him to mount his horse, until the object was attained, and superior duty obliged him, for the direction of other operations. His mien, his venerable and soldier-like appearance, his solemn dignity of manner, combined, with the awful incidents of the scene, to render this one of the most imposing and interesting sights that could be witnessed.

The following is an instance of their ingenuity :— The French cavalry were afraid to remain at night in the out-posts, and withdrew, to the long mortification of the Cozaks, who thus had no opportunity to achieve any enterprize against them. A party came one day to the officer of artillery and requested a loaded shell, which was given them. They went when night fell, and having observed where the enemy's posts by day lighted their fires, they buried it under the ashes. The unsuspecting foe returned in the morning, and, after their patrols, rekindled the usual flame, round which they collected ; in a short time the fuze was enflamed, and the fatal explosion killed and desperately wounded seven men, whilst the exulting Cozaks rushed from their

sia repents of her alliance or not, her strict observance of the treaty, and her steady adhe-

ambuscade to secure the horses of those who could not escape.

The equipment of the Cozak's horse is light ;—a snaffle,—an halter, of which the rein is always held in the hand, that he may be instantly attached on dismounting, or be led with facility,—the tree of a saddle, on which is bound a cushion stuffed with the Cozak's property, and on which he rides,—form the whole of his accoutrements and baggage.

His dress is equally simple ; a blue jacket, (with a white frog on the cuff or cape,) fastened with hooks ; a pair of loose trowsers, plaited so as to cover and conceal the opening in front ; a pair of short boots, a black cap made of the unborn lamb, from which depends a red pandour sack, a plume on the side of the cap, or, what is more common, except in the Ataman's regiment, merely a cloth cap with a kind of sack hanging behind, in which he stuffs his provision or other articles—and a white or black hair Circassian short cloak,—is the costume of the Cozak on service and of his country.

But still an Asiatic taste for the embellishment of warlike accoutrements is blended with the simplicity of his equipment. He disdains the ornament of artificial metals, and solid silver is wrought throughout upon his arms and appointments.

Amongst the common Cozaks is also frequently found a chivalresque spirit, a delicate sense of honour that would grace the very age of chivalry, and be

rence to her promises, while they shew the value and constancy of her friendship, and cover with confusion those who doubted it ; teach Europe to rely in future on her fidelity and perseverance, and may possibly raise

worthy the records that eternize illustrious actions of fidelity and valour.

When a British officer was observing the retreat of Marshal Ney from Guttstadt, his dress and telescope attracted the attention of the enemy, who directed some cannon at him : the first ball struck the moist earth under his horse, and covered the animal and rider with the sods ; —a second ball was fired with similar accuracy, when the attendant Cozak rushed up to him with resentment in his features, and pointing at his helmet, desired him to change it with his cap ; and on the officer's refusal, he attempted to snatch it from his head and substitute his own, but during this contest a shower of musquet balls rendered the horses wild, and they flew apart. When the Cozak was afterwards asked by the Attaman, with feigned anger, for his own explanation of such disrespectful conduct ;—he replied, " I saw that the enemy directed their fire at the English officer on account of his casque and plume—I was appointed by you to protect him—I knew you had marched with many Cozaks, but only one stranger ; it was therefore my duty to avert mischief from him by attracting it to myself, and by so doing preventing the sorrow you and every Cozak would feel at the loss of a guest perishing in your service."

against France powerful and determined enemies, even where they are least expected.

Let, therefore, France buckle on her armour ; and in hostile array march against Russia. Let clouds, portending disaster, gather on ; and the threatening tempest again spread wide its rapid wings, and pour its deluge upon the north : Russia undismayed, awaits, nay, invites the blow. Next to Providence, she relies on the tried heroism of her people ; and on the prayers of the suffering millions, whose champion she now stands forth. Her struggles will be against universal tyranny ; and her success will be the deliverance of all. Her safety will be the protection, and her independence the relief and security of the oppressed. Her cause is the cause of freedom ; and every soil, trod by the foot of a freeman, shall yield to it a tribute of sympathy. Her cause is the cause of humanity ; and wherever man draws the breath of life, blessings shall be its enviable portion.

It is with Russia that the fallen nations can even hope to rise. The frowning idol, under whose iron foot numberless victims daily expire, may yet be hurled from its ensanguined



throne, and awe the world only by its tremendous ruins ! The overgrown colossus, from whose fatal grasp Europe in vain strives to free herself, can only on its own element be crushed. The thunder of Albion has only struck at its shadow on the ocean ; but the huge substance, in which all the ingredients of mischief are consolidated, still remains the same. Some of the distant sparks have only been intercepted ; while the main furnace, wherein such horrid conflagrations are engendered, still remains unextinguished. Even in the regions of the now respiring Lusitania, only some of the monster's limbs have been shattered ; the enormous body is still animated with life and vigour, is still fed by daily torrents of human blood, and endowed with the unnatural power of renovating and increasing its strength at pleasure. To assault its extremities is only to provoke its rage and fury ; but to encounter it at once, in all its dimensions, heart to heart, is the only chance of destroying it. This may yet be hoped from the invasion of Russia.

[The preceding pages were printed in a pamphlet, with the exception of the extracts from Sir Robert Wilson's work, previous to the declaration of war between France and Russia.]

PUBLISHERS.]

APPENDIX.

&c. &c. &c.

HOW far the statements and opinions, contained in the preceding pages, have been justified by subsequent events, it is now in the power of every man to decide—of every man, whose judgment is not warped by prejudices, or who has not sworn, under the illusion of Gallic enchantment, to believe Napoleon infallible, and exempt from all the vicissitudes of human nature. The immense armies, raised by Russia to match a world in arms, show the extent of her resources, and the sufficiency of her population ; the noble perseverance of Alexander proves how unjustly he was distrusted and blamed ; and the voluntary sacrifices, and indissoluble union of the Russian people of all classes, while they furnish a severe satire on the officious moralist, who pretended to pity their fancied misery.

and prescribe rules for their imaginary happiness, cover with shame and confusion the eager slanderer, who, judging perhaps from his own disposition, doubted their loyalty, and conceived treachery to be their inmate. How little was Russia understood ! and how little was it anticipated, that she should give posterity the unprecedented example of a nation of more than 40,000,000 souls without a single traitor ! Such, however, is the fact. She alone was proof against that contagion of French influence, which has penetrated into every other part of the civilized world ; and which, if it really was exerted in Russia to the extent stated, failed where it was most expected to succeed. Not a solitary instance of treason has occurred, and even the famous plot of Speransky, so much spoken of, on inquiry proved groundless, and the supposed culprit, whose innocence was afterwards clearly established, was endowed with a pension of 20,000 roubles a year.* But the Russian talent and

* This ought to be an instructive lesson to all those, who in England and here talk of French pimps, varlets, actresses, musicians, and spies of every denomination, crowding to St. Petersburg, to corrupt the Russian emperor and his ministers !!! If it be true, that creatures of this kind have been so

national character have in no instance been more strikingly illustrated than in the conduct of Count N. Romantzow, the Russian chancellor and prime minister.

This distinguished nobleman, son of a hero whose name will ever shed a lustre on the Russian history, though of acknowledged probity and honour, was suspected, even by some of the Russians, of being a French partizan, as far at least as he was influenced by his own political sentiments and predilections. His apparent cultivation of the French interest, his seeming preference of those who were supposed employed in misleading him, his affected hostility to Great-Britain, and, above all, his journey to Paris, which looked like a slavish homage to Buonaparte, had exposed him to such undisguised obloquy and such galling and disgraceful aspersions, as none, but patriots like himself, could have had the courage and magnanimity to endure with patience. In proportion to this public denunciation were public gratitude, astonishment, and joy, when it

employed, they must have served the Russian government with more fidelity than their own, and the French chief has derived but little profit from their labours.

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was found, from the diplomatic correspondence between him and the French minister, that his deportment was only modified by circumstances, but wholly rested on the firm principle of pure patriotism ; that, by exposing and humbling himself, he was securing and raising his country ; that, while the crafty Frenchmen considered him their tool, they were caught in their own toils ; and that the fruits of his profound policy, were, finally, the conquest of Finland, the most precious gem in the Russian crown ; a formidable army, prepared, increased, and organized under the auspices of the treaty of Tilsitz, which was so much censured because so little understood ; and a glorious peace with Turkey, at a most critical juncture, when Russia wanted every soldier at home—a peace, which annexed to her empire the Moldavian provinces as far as the Pruth ; which secured her triumph over all the counteracting influence of the French ; and shewed, that the Turkish divan had a better knowledge of the means of Russia, than all the cabinets of Europe, and that it acted with better policy and foresight as to the issue of the impending contest.

Alexander himself is intitled to equal credit for having, by a temporary humiliation,

consented to an interview on the Niemen, the object of which interview was the ultimate salvation of his country. He was suddenly involved in a war, in which, through the nefarious conduct of the British "talent" administration, he beheld himself abandoned by those very men by whose solicitation, and for whose interest, he had recourse to arms ; and while he alone had to withstand the gigantic force of France, bringing in her train all the subjugated nations of Europe, his prospect of relief was yet distant, as his armies, scattered over the face of his vast empire, could not be collected in time enough to arrest the progress of the enemy. Thus circumstanced, he accepted of the peace of Tilsitz, which added to his territories considerable possessions ; and, strange as it may seem, secured to him all its essential advantages, inasmuch as Buonaparte, though the eclat of the negociation rested with him, lost thereby the favourable opportunity of invading Russia, and allowed Alexander all the necessary time to strengthen himself against such an attempt in future. At the very moment that the submission of the Russian emperor was a theme of universal reprobation, and with many an object of

senseless and unceasing clamour, he was contemplating the approaching crisis of his empire, and was preparing for a contest, in which there would be no compromise, and in which Russia was to conquer and be the first power on the European continent, or to fall, and be erased from the list of nations. No sooner had he finished his preparations, no sooner had he surveyed with an eye of intelligence his own resources, and the unanimous exertions of his people, determined to support him to their utmost, than he took an elevated ground from which France could not drive him, but by force.* He sought no war, but

* It must not be inferred from this, that Alexander was the aggressor and violator of the peace of Tilsitz. Whatever were the motives that led to that peace, his observance of it was so sacred, that, though the enemy's preparations were carried on upon the Vistula with increasing vigour, and though policy commanded to check them by the seizure of all the magazines and stores collecting for the French army, in direct contravention of subsisting engagements, he forbore to execute that measure, and gave up all the advantages which caution demanded, and which his power might secure, merely to preserve his honour, and his reputation for good faith, unsullied. Very soon after the peace, Buonaparte gave such glaring proofs of his duplicity by continuing his troops in Prussia, contrary to the articles of the

was determined rather to encounter it, than to recede an inch ; and far from fearing it, he left the choice of it to his adversaries. Nay, he sent forth a noble defiance in the person of the duke of Oldenburgh, who, being deprived of his dukedom by Buonaparte, was invited to Russia, and received the hand of Alexander's sister, the very princess who was refused to the French emperor. Finding such unequivocal tokens of the resentment of Russia, Napoleon was willing to appease her by indemnifying the duke of Oldenburgh ; but she would not even listen to his proposals, unless they should be preceded by his with-

treaty, and by his spoliation of the duchy of Oldenburgh, as to justify Alexander's resentment, and furnish him with every possible excuse for his preparatory measures. It was then that Buonaparte found, though too late, that he mistook the Russian emperor, and relied rather too much on the terror of his own name. He found, what he did not perhaps expect, that Alexander was not to be appeased by hollow professions, and offers of indemnity, or to be subdued by threats of invasion. In short, he was, by his own imprudence, forced to undertake the execution of his threats, at a time when his affairs in Spain dictated a different line of conduct. Hence his rage was only to be quelled by the total annihilation of the Russian empire.

drawing all his troops from the Prussian territories. This fixed demand, an unequivocal proof of confidence and readiness to meet the foe—of deliberate resolution, not of despair and necessity, to confront the danger, that, by a trifling compromise, might early have been averted, was too galling to Buonaparte's pride ; and his refusing to comply, produced the extraordinary campaign which has completely verified the fourth section of the preceding tract, relating to the military powess*

* Among the most remarkable features of this campaign are, the orderly and masterly retreat of the Russians, heightened by the contrast exhibited afterwards in the shameful flight of the French ; the uniformly correct conduct of the Russian generals and officers, not one of whom seems to have committed a single mistake for which he was censured or superseded ; while in the French army Davoust, Junot, and Sebastiani were severely reproved, and Jerome Buonaparte was actually dismissed, and sent home in disgrace ; and that, while honours came thick upon Kutuzow, Wintenstein, and other Russian generals, the French officers experienced but few if any favours, from their own emperor. There are other facts, not immediately connected with this campaign, which make the contrast still greater, and deserve to be mentioned here. In all the various encounters, between the Russian and French generals, the former have had the advantage ; and there

of Russia, and of which a sketch is attempted here, as far as the scantiness of information

are only two among the latter, that have not always been worsted. Massena was only once out of three times successful ; and Buonaparte himself only twice out of five : that is, Massena, with numbers more than treble, defeated Korsakoff at Zurich, but notwithstanding the same numerical superiority, he was defeated afterwards by Suwarow in Switzerland, and again by Essen, near Warsaw ; while Buonaparte was victorious at Austerlitz and Friedland (in the last he had 90,000 men against 40,000 Russians) but was unquestionably foiled at Pultusk, Eylau, and Borodino, (smaller battles, such as took place at Ostrowno, Smolensk, and even Heilsberg, being only preludes to greater, are not included.) With these two exceptions, every other French general was successively defeated, in spite of the uniform advantage of superior numbers. The illustrious Moreau, and he need not blush at the recollection yielded only to Suwarow ; but others, for example St. Cyr, Oudinot, Davoust, Victor, Murat, Eugene Beauharnois, Regnier, Bernadotte, Junot, and Sebastiani, were in every trial beaten by Wintenstein, Bagration, Miloradowitz, Sacken, and Barclay de Tolly, the pupils of Suwarow. I make no mention of prince Kutuzow, Platow, and Beningzen, because these were the fellow soldiers of the veteran Russian hero.

Such palpable and constant difference in favour of the one, and against the other, cannot be accidental, and must proceed from some substantial, and perma-

from official sources, and the author's moderate abilities, could favour such an undertaking.

The forces collected by Buonaparte, and brought against Russia according to the French 12th bulletin, amounted to 680,000 men, and, according to the English accounts,

ment cause, not to be found in the mere physical strength of the Russian soldier, inasmuch as soldiers are an artificial body, and must be supported chiefly by the skill of the commanders. If justice, therefore, bid us to acknowledge, that this superiority must rest with the officers themselves, it will be asked, why was it generally denied or discredited? The answer is, that in the imposing splendour of the French revolution, and Buonaparte's successes, in which every soldier appeared a hero, and which magnified the prowess and skill of France, beyond all natural and just proportion, the previous claims of Russia to military fame were entirely overlooked and forgotten. Nobody thought for a moment, that she had consummate generals, long before the French revolution had brought forth her infant brood; and that, in France, the present proportion of officers, properly educated, to those who arose from the ranks of common soldiers, (well versed in practice, but deficient in theory, and able when commanded, but less capable to command,) is far greater than is, in Russia, the proportion of officers without education, to those, who from their infancy enter the military school, and with subsequent experience unite a previous knowledge of tactics.

to 493,000. The first is undoubtedly an exaggeration, as the French will not tell a plain fact, even when it is very favourable to themselves; and the latter seems to be much nearer to truth, except that the contribution of Poland, in the enumeration of the component parts of the army, is stated at 60,000, a thing absolutely impossible, when it is considered that the Russians had previously carried off all the disposable force, and that the greater part of Poland still remained in their hands, leaving to the French a reduced population, not in condition to furnish 5000 effective men. The term, Poland, in the English enumeration, is evidently meant to apply to the Russian possessions, as the aid furnished by Austria and Prussia was distinctly marked, without any allusion to their respective shares in that country; and Napoleon, at least over the Austrian part, could not, and did not, exercise the right of conquest. In truth, Austrian and Prussian Poland, united, could not furnish half the number stated; we shall therefore take Alexander's statement in his proclamation after the battle of Borodino, as the most moderate, and entitled to credit, and which makes the French

force amount to 300,000 men;* a force which has not been matched since the introduction of the modern system of warfare, and one half of which, in prowess and expense, is at least equal to one million upon the ancient scale.

At the head of this vast and prodigious body, containing the essence of sixty millions, Napoleon, its animating soul, entered Russia in June last, preceded by the terror of his name, and followed by famine and desolation.

* The emperor evidently alludes to the force that had actually entered Russia proper, and consequently Macdonald's, prince Swartzenburg's and Regnier's corps, which had not passed the Dwina, as well as the 11th corps under the duke of Castiglione (Augereau) which remained in Prussia, to be called in as occasion required, are not included in the account; and when added together, must make an increase of at least 100,000 men, thus bringing the whole near the amount stated by the English, after a due allowance for the exaggerated *quota*, said to have been furnished by Poland. Therefore, we shall estimate hereafter the whole French force at 400,000 men; the more so as Napoleon, knowing the military strength of Russia, would not dare to invade her, unless his own means were superior, or at least equal: for, it is a solemn fact, that he never has yet dared to meet an enemy on equal terms, and uniformly trusted to his superior numbers.

Flushed with past triumphs, proud of his present might, and elated with the idea that his greatest efforts must be resistless, he fancied himself a god, and pronounced his fiat in the following remarkable sentence : “ the destinies of Russia must be accomplished.” The modest Alexander, apparently yielding to the shock, but deriving his firmness from better sources—from Providence, the love of his people, and the justness of his cause, replied, that “ he would not sheathe his sword as long as a single enemy remained on his territories”—and the contest became mortal.

It seemed for a while, as if marching to either of the Russian capitals depended only on the will and choice of Buonaparte. Though he made demonstrations of moving towards St. Petersburg, and publicly announced such to be his intentions, yet there were some who suspected he would prefer the road to Moskow ;* and that his taking at first the

* The author was always of this opinion ; and his reasons were, that Moskow, besides being nearer, presented a greater facility of supplies from the surrounding fertile country ; and, with a view to the final conquest of Russia, to be effected only by the destruction of her moral as well as physical force, was far more important than St. Petersburg, being

northernmost course was probably a mere military manœuvre to deceive. This suspicion was fully verified ; for no sooner did he perceive an opening between Bagration's corps and the main Russian army, than he made a dashing movement to the right between them, and was so sure of intercepting the Russian general, as to announce the fact before it was accomplished. Bagration, however, eluded his pursuit, and disappointed all his calculations. After an extraordinary march of more than 20 miles per day, for 20 days successively, in which he often turned like a lion on his pursuers, he made his retreat good, without any loss whatever, and joined the main body at Smolensk, after a series of triumphs, which excited the world's admiration, and for which marshal Davoust, (duke of Eckmuhl) who unsuccessfully pursued the very heart of the Russian empire. For the reasons above mentioned, it seems improbable, that Buonaparte, as some supposed, was diverted from his course by Bagration, who manœuvred for that purpose. On the contrary, it is more likely, that the French emperor, with his usual promptness, wished to profit by the state of uncertainty, into which, by concealing his movements, he thought he had thrown the Russian general.

him, was publicly censured by his master, and accused of want of activity. Buonaparte, however, seems to have so far attained his object, as to derange the Russians in their plan of operation ; and to compel them, perhaps sooner than they otherwise would have done, successively to abandon Drissa and Polotzk, and to fall back from Witepsk, where they intended to make a stand, to Smolensk, in order to get the support of Bagration, who could not join them in the former place, as was concerted. This accelerated movement of the whole Russian army was preceded by the affair of Ostrowno, and many sanguinary skirmishes, in which Sebastiani was surprised, Junot made "a false movement," and Jerome lost his cavalry so as to yield to the retreating Russians the palm of victory, and provoke Napoleon's anger and displeasure. Though the Russians had no intrenchments near Smolensk, and therefore were more exposed than at Witepsk, yet they awaited the enemy with confidence. The attack was general upon all points ; but the French did not get possession of the town, until the Russian generals, after a council of war, agreed not to defend it. It was accord-

ingly entered by sufferance ; and the Russians retreated farther. It appears from a passage in Kutuzow's despatch, after the battle of Borodino, *implying the abandonment of Moskow to be merely the result of the abandonment of Smolensk*, that, had he been then in command, he would have defended the town to his utmost power ; but, be this as it may, the Russian generals abandoned it merely in pursuance of a previous system of retreating and destroying all supplies, a system which was wisely adopted, and successfully executed. At this time, the French army was extended from the Dnieper to the Dwina, and, on both sides of this last river, as far as Daunberg, and thence along its left bank as far as the extremity of Livonia and Courland, where Riga was threatened, and Mittau besieged, by Macdonald. Witepsk and Polotzk were in the enemy's possession ; but Wintenstein, who had fought several successful battles with Oudinot on the 30th and 31st of July, and between 16th and 18th of August, about the time that Buonaparte was engaged at Smolensk, maintained his position on the lower Dwina, against the utmost efforts of the enemy, so obstinately, as to leave him but small advantages from the occupation of the towns

and other places higher up the river. This was a serious check ; but Buonaparte disregarded it, and pushed forward, trusting all to fortune, and calculating, in his usual manner, that one desperate blow would repair all the rest. The action of Volontina, which he called a skirmish of the first order, in contradistinction of the battle of Smolensk, the first that deserved to be so named, closed his career, which by its uninterrupted rapidity, diverted the public attention from details, covered smaller disasters, and, in the general prospect of success, obscuring all minor objects, presented Russia as already conquered ; the more so, as a distance of nearly 150 miles, from Smolensk to Mojaïsk, was traversed by the French in about 14 days, without meeting the least resistance.

It was however at this moment of inactivity, apparently auspicious to Buonaparte, and ominous to themselves, that the Russians were preparing to give a mortal blow to all his hopes and projects. For it was at this interval, that Barclay de Tolly, minister at war, an officer of acknowledged talents, who had so much distinguished himself at Pultusk, Eylau, and Finland,—by whose wisdom and

exertion the staff and the commissariat* were brought to the highest state of improvement,—and to whose genius were ascribed the original conception and mature digestion of the daring and extensive Russian system of self-defence,—resigned the chief command, which he held for a time, to Kutuzow, an illustrious veteran of 75, fellow-soldier and admirer of Suwarow, beloved by the Russian army, and commanding the confidence of all the classes, particularly of the nobility, of whom he was one, and of the inhabitants of Moskow, where he was impatiently expected from Moldavia, after a successful termination, by peace, of his campaign in that country. The Russians, united and inspired with the presence of their beloved leader, were now determined to conquer or to die ; but he evidently aimed only to cripple the enemy, whose forces, being superior, he could not hope to disperse with one effort. Moskow, though its destruction, on

* In this last department some defects and abuses existed, which Sir Robert Wilson has justly censured, but which, by the good administration of the minister, have been completely removed ; so as to secure to the Russian army advantages in every respect equal to those of the enemy.

a certain contingency, had been predetermined, was not to be given up without a struggle ; and honour did not allow the Russians to abandon their ancient capital, without making the enemy pay dear for it, and without showing him, they could, if they pleased, successfully dispute with him the field of battle. For these reasons, Kutuzow awaited the French at Mojaïsk, (or rather at Borodino, a small village in front) and for these reasons alone ; for, otherwise, he would have still delayed the dreadful encounter, as the position was not very favourable, though the only one that could be obtained between Smolensk and Moskow. Two days previous to the battle, the prince, in his despatch to the emperor, described this position as a strong one, except the ground, on his left, which was disadvantageous, and could only be maintained by his best troops. Accordingly, the gallant, ever-to-be-lamented Bagration was posted there with his brave companions, the flower of the Russian army. This self-devoted band, that never yet flinched from superior numbers, and sought nothing but victory or death, sustained the shock of the whole French army ; as Buonaparte, aware of the weakness of their position, directed his main force against them.

We may judge with what heroism they withstood for a whole day the repeated and concentrated attempts of the desperate foe, since, out of the whole corps, amounting to 30,000 men, only 8,000 are said to have escaped unhurt ; but they justified the high expectations of their country, and of their beloved chief, Suwarow's favourite pupil, who was himself mortally wounded, but had lived to see victory perch upon his standard, and expired afterwards, rejoicing that he proved himself worthy of his great master, and that his death would add fresh lustre to the glory of the Russian nation.

The battle commenced on the 4th of September, and lasted with various success till the 7th, when it assumed its final and horrible aspect, turning the actions of the three preceding days into mere skirmishes, or sportive trials of strength. Since the introduction of modern tactics, there has never been a battle like this, as to the prodigious extent of forces engaged on both sides, the skill of the respective commanders and officers, the bravery and discipline of the troops, and the horrid slaughter of men, falling like a ripened harvest beneath the sweeping hurricane. Each moment a thousand mouths, as the 18th bulletin says,

scattered death on all sides, and with torrents of human blood deluged the earth. In short, the horrors of this sanguinary day, surpassed the horrors of the 8th of February 1806, as much as this last (the battle of Eylau) surpassed, in destruction, all the intermediate and the preceding battles recorded in the annals of the civilized world. There is only this resemblance in them, that the Russians in both fought against superior numbers, and in both remained masters of the field, though the armies, on each side, were so disabled as to undertake nothing of consequence for a long time after. The essential advantages, however, of the battle of Borodino, were evidently on the side of the Russians; and a few facts will convince every impartial reader of the truth of this assertion.

The Russian accounts, which by their modest and temperate tone, when contrasted with the inflated strain of the French bulletins, created at first despondence, but now are entitled to additional confidence; expressly announced, that Buonaparte was driven back about 3 o'clock at noon, and that the battle was won by the Russians, who, according to subsequent reports, remained for two days on

the field, removing the wounded, and burying the dead, and only quitted it after a deliberate consultation ; in other words, in compliance with their original system. The French 18th bulletin, in describing this battle, evidently accords with the Russian accounts, if not in terms, at least in matter implied. It acknowledges the action was over, early in the afternoon, suppressing merely, that, though it was over with the French, it was not so with the Russians, whose fire had not ceased till night. But the date of the bulletin is conclusive, being on the third day after the battle ; that is, as soon as the Russians, at the expiration of two days claimed by them, had retired, and gave the French an opportunity of dating their bulletin on the field of battle. It is well known that the French, as well as other generals, if victorious, always date their despatches immediately after a battle ; and accordingly the Russian general issued his own the next morning, on the 8th of September, while Buonaparte deferred his till the 10th, a circumstance which no sophistry can reconcile with his pretensions to victory. So desirous was he to repel the suspicion of having failed, that not being able to state the subsequent

positions of the Russian army, as is generally expected from a victor, and warranted by Buonaparte's former practice, he employed a Polish renegado in reconnoitring the *fugitives*; and for the first time was obliged to substitute the supposed information, given by Russian sergeants and recruits, for that which, if he had conquered, he had completely in his power to furnish in a manner much more entitled to credit. Indeed, sometime or other it will appear in history, that the mere desire of concealing his defeat, induced him, contrary to the advice of his best generals, to advance at all hazards; and approach that gulph of destruction, which he otherwise would probably have avoided.

Thus far the honour of the day remained with the Russians; and their victory could not be denied by any of those, with whom the mere keeping of the field is the best criterion of success; but there are many, who, with more propriety, judge of the success by the consequences, and who will naturally ask, why did Kutuzow retire, if he were successful, and give up Moskow to destruction? The answer is, that Napoleon's advancing was a proof, not of his victory, but of rashness,

the fatal effects of which he soon experienced ; and that Kutuzow's retreat was the result of wisdom, which suspended, for a moment, his triumph, but soon more firmly established it, and in more striking colours displayed it to the world. As to the destruction of Moscow, there are facts enough to justify us in making the Russian general speak for himself, and thus he must have reasoned :—

“ I know, that the enemy cannot easily recover from the severe blow I have inflicted on him ; but I am also sensible, that, in the struggle, I have myself been much weakened. I have done enough for the honour of my country, and for my own reputation ; and it is time to think of means, sure, yet the least expensive, to finish the work, which cost so much in the beginning, but whose progress is now rendered less difficult. If I resolve on another battle, I must sacrifice a great many brave men, and my utmost success can only be, to drive the enemy back upon his reinforcements, which may sustain him, and enable him to renew his efforts ; but if I retard the hour of decision, until his festering wounds spread a mortal languor over his whole body, I shall ensure success, and save my soldiers, whose lives are of more importance to the

country, than the destruction of the capital—the mere destruction of a certain kind of property—all measures having already been taken to remove the inhabitants, with their personal effects. It is true, that the preserving of the city might not materially impede the final issue, on which I calculate with confidence ; but, as it is intended to starve the enemy in his new quarters, by destroying these, I wish only to preserve the lives of the citizens, who otherwise may probably remain there, and share the fate of their invaders. Besides, the nobility, the merchants, and other classes, being willing to make this sacrifice, I shall choose the least of evils, by allowing the enemy to enter Moskow, whither, I doubt not, his rashness will lead him, but where he will give me an opportunity of encompassing, more effectually, his ruin.”

The council of war sanctioned this resolution, and the Russian general, like a skilful hunter, who had mortally wounded a fierce animal, stepped aside to wait merely till his ferocious prey should be ensnared by its own rage, and exhausted by its fruitless exertions, so as to be destroyed, at the end, with more facility and less sacrifice. Every thing was accordingly foreseen ; every necessary measure

adopted ; all calculations made with wonderful accuracy ; and all expectations were crowned with perfect success.

The flames, which illuminated Buonaparte's entrance into Moskow, on the 14th of Sept. enlightened him, for the first time, on the reality of his perilous situation, and on the Russian national character; which he had so far misconceived, as to flatter himself, that, from its supposed instability, from the fancied disaffection of the nobles, and the presumed weakness in the government, Russia, overcome by the spirit of intrigue, and ensnared in his artful negociations, would not hesitate to commit at length the monstrous crime of suicide. It was in the smoking ruin of the ancient city of the czars, that he beheld a funeral pyre, on which were consumed all his hopes of dividing the Russian people, and either of alluring the peasantry with the *glittering toys* of French liberty, or of intimidating their emperor with the glare of the Parisian sword. It was there that all his imaginary projects of fresh triumphs, and of new conquests, in an instant vanished ; and the dark September-night, brooding over the vast conflagration, as if to conceal it from the eye of vengeful heaven, was but a faint image of

the tyrant's frowns, and that outward gloom, beneath which raged the various contending passions of his soul. With fury he saw himself defeated in the field and the cabinet ; and with terror he discovered himself on the verge of that precipice, into which he vainly and daringly laboured to plunge a loyal nation, which was at peace with him, and which, though brave and powerful, was moderate in its pretensions. His inconceivable imprudence, perhaps the result of too much confidence, in extending his line from Smolensk to Moskow, before he had driven the Russians from the Dwina and Riga, and over a tract of land, very little wider than the road on which he passed, to the unusual distance of 200 miles, without any intermediate fortresses to secure the communication by strong links, soon placed him in the power of the Russian generals, who from different points acted in perfect concert against him. Kutuzow, by his admirable position on the right wing of the French army, menaced its flank with upwards of 100,000 men; and Winzingerode, communicating with him through Mojaïsk, directly across the French line, from the opposite side on the enemy's left, was very active at the head of 30,000.

men : while Wintenstein, with 60,000 men, annoyed the rear ; and Tchitchagoff, with 80,000, instead of marching from Moldavia to Moskow, as was expected, was pushing towards Minsk, to drive away the united corps of Ragnier and Swartzenburg, and to intercept the whole plan of French operations. Buonaparte's main army, at Moskow, was thus inclosed on all sides ; his regular supplies were at once cut off ; and the " tug of war " was commencing at the very moment, which, he fondly expected, would terminate it.* If he marched towards Toula and Kaluga, he had Kutuzow's whole army in his front, and exposed his rear to Winzingerode, acting on the Twer road, and to Wintenstein, who, by maintaining his position on the Dwina, kept in check St. Cyr and Victor, on his right, and threatened the whole French line, on his left ; but if Buonaparte marched to St. Petersburg, he again exposed his rear to Kutuzow, without being able to change his line of operation, confined to Smolensk by the gallant conduct of Winten-

* Kutuzow, in his interview with Lauriston, who was sent to request an armistice, some time after the French had been at Moskow, expressly declared, that the campaign was just begun with the Russians.

stein, who, in protecting the Dwina, made any movement that way impracticable. In this distressing dilemma, a new enemy, Famine, appeared in its most frightful aspect; and added to the dangers, and the complicated difficulties of the French at Moskow. True, the surrounding country was fertile; but small foraging parties were destroyed, as soon as they appeared, and larger detachments were inexpedient, as they would have diminished the main army to a degree inconsistent with its safety, in presence of the imposing force of Kutuzow. Buonaparte had no alternative but that of speedy and disgraceful flight, or of seeking a general engagement. The first his pride was not yet humbled enough to permit for a moment; and the last, if successful, would have retrieved his affairs in an instant, and relieved all his distresses. What could then induce a man, till now so eager for battle, to avoid it at the moment when imperious necessity, no less than the salvation of his army, demanded it; and when inactivity, of all the evils, appeared the greatest? What could check his attempts to advance at least about 100 miles to the south, where *Kaluga* would give him its granary, and *Toula* the ar-

moury of the Russian empire ; or to the north of Moskow, where *Twer*, about the same distance, would deposit at his feet the immense supplies carried from the southern to the northern regions of the empire, and relieve his soldiers from the miserable fate of starving, while beholding, like Tantalus, the waters of the Volga, charged with plenty, flow within their reach ? It would be impossible to answer these questions, if we had not shewn before, that he was completely disabled in the terrible battle of Borodino ; for, though by artfully glossing over his defeat, he succeeded in imposing, for a time, upon the world, he could not impose upon himself, or conceal from his own knowledge, that he had paid so dear a prize, to save appearances, as to make himself a bankrupt and a ruined man. The Russian general, who could not be deceived, was so conscious of his own advantages, that, at the moment the world doubted his ability to contend with Buonaparte's troops, he was already planning how to intercept them, and ordered the army from Moldavia,—that very army with whose assistance, it was supposed, he could not dispense,—to proceed with all possible speed to the north of Poland.

It cannot be said, that Buonaparte did not seek battle on the supposition, that Kutuzow would not give him the opportunity ; because the latter was at a short distance, professing his readiness to meet the enemy ; and at all events, the attempt was worth much, as the mere retreat of the Russian general, further into the interior, might have procured to the French many of the wished-for advantages. It would be equally erroneous to suppose, that Napoleon's long stay at Moskow, proceeded from confidence in his own strength ; because this tardiness naturally explains itself by his extreme reluctance to confirm, by such a step, the complete failure of his object. Moreover, he still entertained some hopes of reinforcement, the appearance of which, between Smolensk and Moskow, induced the Russians, already impatient for combat, to end his indecision, by the brilliant attack of October 18th, on Murat's corps, which was completely defeated, by the renowned Beningsen.

The immediate consequence of this victory was the evacuation of Moskow, and the reoccupation of it, on the 22d, by the Russians. Buonaparte, after the lame apology, that he was going to winter quarters, though he held

out *winter quarters at Moskow*, as a chief inducement to his soldiers, before the battle of Borodino, quitted the city, whose ruin he had indirectly achieved,* and the destruction of

* The attempt to clear Buonaparte from having caused the conflagration of Moskow, because he did not apply the match himself, is unworthy of honest and reflecting men. As well it may be maintained, that he is guiltless of shedding human blood in so many battles, because he only, *in pure innocence*, brought a few thousand men together, in such a way, that they could not help themselves, and were obliged to butcher each other ! ! The wanton barbarity of blowing up the Kremlin, and the unprofitable cruelty in attempting to demolish, in the same way, the cathedral of Smolensko, plainly shew, that the timely sacrifices of the Russians, in their own defence, had only robbed his fury of the objects on which it would vent itself. The cant, about his saving Vienna, Berlin, and other capitals, is truly hypocritical ; inasmuch as he never was driven, an enraged fugitive, from those cities. The Russians, by doing themselves, what they knew him capable of doing, had the advantage of exhibiting a pledge of persevering resistance, which appalled him ; and of raising a monument of patriotism, whose splendour shall increase with each succeeding age. Mr. Whitbread labours to depreciate the loyalty and voluntary offerings of the Russian people, by saying, that Moskow was destroyed by military command ; and that the Russians exerted themselves altogether

whose remaining part he had savagely ordered. His course was directed back towards Mojaïsk, the place ennobled by his memorable

from their sense of subordination. This is saying, that the execution, by the military, of what was resolved by the citizens, is tyranny and oppression; and the love of country ceases to be such, the moment it becomes well regulated. Certainly, it does not resemble that love, which Mr. Whitbread is constantly spouting in Parliament; and which, like *froth*, on the surface of some *fermenting* fluid, can be skimmed off in an instant. Has this senseless declaimer, the worthy associate of the profligate Cobbet, ever heard of the Russian peasantry, of both sexes, voluntarily arming themselves, swearing on the altar of their God to perish for each other, and attacking the enemy, without even an officer to lead them? If he has not, let him hear it now, and be silent for his own credit. Has he ever heard of the Russian convicts executing faithfully the task assigned to them, when all authority that might enforce their obedience was removed, and when to obey was death? If he has not, let him learn now, that even the Russian convicts are more honest and loyal, than the clamorous patriots of his own fashion, whom no prudent man will dare to trust so far. Has he ever heard of gentlemen in Russia, offering, as did Mr. Mamonoff, their whole estates in gift to the government—estates, the annual income of which would at least be estimated at 100,000 roubles? If he hears this for the first time, let him give as much to his

defeat on the 7th of Sept. ; tho' he manœuvred so as to make the object of his movements at least doubtful. Being acquainted at this time with another disaster, of Oct. 18th, simultaneous with Murat's discomfiture, and second in the scale of fatality to that of Borodino—the storming of Polotzk, and the total defeat of St. Cyr—in consequence of which marshal Victor, who had advanced from Smolensk to the assistance of the main army, was compelled to fall back with precipitation—and hearing also that the principal part of Kutuzow's army was marching to Malojaroslavitz to intercept him, Buonaparte, left now altogether to his own resources, and bereft of all hope of speedy assistance, ordered Davoust to dislodge some of the Russians from this town who had already entered it on the 23d : But they, after a tremendous conflict, lasting the whole next day, when the town was taken and retaken eleven

own government, and so purchase the right of questioning the loyalty and devotion of the Russians ; or, if this please him not, let him ask his friend Napoleon's opinion of them, and publish it for the edification of Dr. Clarke, the Edinburgh Reviewers, and all those less significant, though still more zealous calumniators and defamers of the Russian nation, both in England and in America, with whose names it would be an insult to the reader to stain these pages.

times, firmly maintained their ground ; and on the 25th, when Buonaparte himself joined in the attack, the Russians, being also reinforced, drove him back with disgrace to the main road from which he had started, and where, on the preceding day (24th), at the small village of Grid-nevo, he had already a sample of the *barbarous* enterprize of the Cozaks, who, “ though they make nothing but noise,” contrived to break into the very centre of his columns, and take six pieces from his park of artillery.

Whether Buonaparte, by making this attack, intended to pass through the southern provinces, or merely to secure his retreat to Smolensk, which place the Russians might have reached by a shorter way, through Malo-jaroslavitz, it is certain, that he was obliged to retrograde to the main road, and thus confirm his defeat by a total failure in his object. The obstinacy of the attack was however so great, as to excite Kutuzow’s principal attention to the safety of the southern provinces, in consequence of which, Buonaparte gained two or three days’ march ; but, at the moment that this was extolled on his part as an excellent military manœuvre, which succeeded in deceiving the Russian veteran, General

Miloradowitz, on the one hand, and Platow on the other, convinced the enemy that his hopes, and those of his supporters, were ill founded ; that deceivers often deceive themselves ; and that it was not easy, even for the “ flying ” French columns, to run away from the Russians. Indeed, from this time, the French retreat was converted into a flight, and their rout became general. Buonaparte, with his guards, had gone a head ; but the corps of Davoust, Ney, and Eugene were overtaken, broken, and pursued through Medin, Wiasma, and Duchovshtchina, between which and Dorochovitchna, the viceroy’s corps (Eugene’s) was separated and dispersed on the 8th of November, by the indefatigable Platow. A series of disasters, which now followed the French, and of which, every inch of the road they left, presented dreadful tokens, in the sick and wounded abandoned, horses dead or dying by hundreds, baggage, ammunition, and cannon, thrown away in the greatest disorder and confusion, cannot be better described, than in the intercepted letters of Eugene, and in the 29th bulletin itself. It was a scene of horror, not to be mitigated even by the reflection, that it was also an evidence of the retributive justice of heaven,

frowning upon the lawless and unprincipled invader.

While such was the progress of the Russians in this quarter, and while count Wintenstein* was following up his successes in another—a part of his army having retaken Witepsk, on the 7th, and made the governor and some of the garrison prisoners—he himself crossing the Dwina, and pursuing St. Cyr to Lapelle ;—the Russian army, under Kutuzow, was marching in a southern direction, parallel to the main road, with an intention of occupying Krasnoy, in front of Smolensko ; and thus of intercepting the enemy's retreat. Buonaparte, however, got the start by several days ; and on the 9th, when the Russian guard reached Elna, he was already at Smolensk ; which place he would have left immediately, were it not that the shattered condition of his troops prevented them from keeping pace with him, and compelled him to wait for them three days, with the utmost

* The author regrets extremely that he cannot communicate any particular intelligence concerning this brave and meritorious officer ; his own deeds, however, speak for him, and are the best comments upon his talents, so forcibly displayed on every occasion.

anxiety and apprehension, as every moment of delay rendered his situation more critical, and even his personal safety, at best, doubtful.

It will be recollected, that Buonaparte affected to consider his retreat from Moskow as a mere political measure, calculated to bring him nearer to St. Petersburg, and to his own resources ; intimating thereby, that Smolensko was his place of destination and "land of promise." This wonderful improvement in military science, this new method of advancing by going backwards, or of approaching a certain point, by actually receding from it, was reserved for the inventive genius of Buonaparte ; for, Smolensko being only 20 miles nearer to St. Petersburg, and the distance from Moskow to Smolensko being about 200 miles, he must have, of course, marched 180 miles farther from his object, in search of a worse road, and at a season too, when any military movement must be the result of dire necessity !!! Absurd, ridiculous, and childish as this protest was, Napoleon's creatures seized it with avidity ; and, willing to be cheated, in order to cheat others, they received it, even with gratitude, as a token of his kindness and condescension ; their disappointment, chagrin, and vexation, there-

fore, on hearing of his removal from so eligible a spot, were so great, that they would not believe even his own confession, which truly stated, that the Moldavian army advancing to Minsk made Smolensko untenable ; and that, notwithstanding the lateness of the season, and the inclemency of the weather, he was compelled to decamp, in order to avoid being surrounded and cut off by Kutuzow in the rear, Wintenstein in flank, and Tchitchagoff in front. Having at length conjured up a new phantom of "winter quarters at Wilna," which consoled and satisfied his unbelieving friends on both sides the Atlantic, he left Smolensko, on the 13th, with about 50,000 men, marching to Krasnoy, apparently in the following order : Eugene, who seems to have escaped with the shattered remnant of his corps reduced to about 10,000 men, formed the advanced guard ; Buonaparte, with his own guards, and Davoust, were in the centre with 25,000 ; and Ney brought up the rear with 15,000 men. A small Russian party, which had already occupied Krasnoy, immediately evacuated it ; and Eugene, it seems, passed on with, comparatively, a small loss ; but the centre was stopped by Miloradowitz,

Bagration's worthy successor, whose activity in having outsped the enemy,* and brought 40

* The rapidity of this movement, so fatal to the enemy, and the astonishing vigilance and dexterity displayed in the whole pursuit of the French, again prove how unjustly the Russians, among other faults, were charged with want of activity; and were allowed no other good quality, but that of passive valour, the result of slavish fears, rather than of true courage. The ungrateful world forgot, that Suwarow's march to the river Rimnick, by which he saved the Austrian army from destruction; and his march to Trebia, in Italy, which prevented Macdonald's junction with Moreau, have no parallel in history; and, indeed, his whole Italian campaign was a scene of activity altogether unexampled. The present campaign in Russia will thus revive, by new feats, the remembrance of former achievements. Bagration's march to Smolensko; Oertel's expedition to Slutzk, when he marched upwards of 24 miles for several days without intermission, in the hottest season, and often without food or water; and particularly colonel Tchernishew's journey, at the head of a small cavalry detachment, from Volhynia to the Dwina, a distance of 500 miles, traversed in five days, will live for ever in the memory of man. This last appears so romantic and incredible, that lord Cathcart's despatch, by announcing it, was nearly deprived of its official authentic character; but if the reader bears in mind the extracts, given in the preceding tract, in

pieces of cannon to bear, is as honourable to himself, as to the foresight, judicious arrangements, and well-timed orders of the venerable commander in chief, Kutuzow. In the action thus forced, which took place on the 17th, Buonaparte and Davoust (the latter was wounded) saved themselves only by flight ; and left 20,000, nearly the whole corps, killed, wounded, and prisoners, in the hands of the Russians. Ney came up, the next day, (18th,) and shared the same fate. Forty pieces of cannon opened upon him, at the distance of 250 yards, in consequence of which 12,000 men laid down their arms ; and the rest being nearly destroyed, the marshal, who was himself wounded, with the greatest difficulty escaped.

which are mentioned several feats performed by the Russian cavalry, without any apparent diminution of power in the horses, he will have no doubt, that the journey was actually performed ; the more so, as colonel Tchernishew is renowned for exploits of this kind, having once gone from St. Petersburg to Paris in 14 days, the quickest travelling ever known.

The author himself has more than once travelled in Russia upwards of 120 miles in one day, without changing the horses ; and on one occasion, he owed his life entirely to this prodigious strength of the Russian horse.

Thus, out of 85,000 effective men, composing the grand army at the time of leaving Moskow, as appeared from the returns of the French commissary general, who was made prisoner, 38,000 were destroyed or taken between Moskow and Smolensko, from October 22d to November 9th ; 35,000 between Smolensko and Krasnoy, on the 16th, 17th, and 18th of November ; and 12,000 only escaped, being Buonaparte's guards, and the remnant, still further reduced, of Eugene's corps.

Oudinot, who resumed the command after St. Cyr, and Victor (duke of Belluno), all this while remained near New Lapelle, collecting all the forces they could from East Prussia, and the different garrisons in Poland, in order to relieve Buonaparte, of whose dangerous situation they were fully informed. As Wintenstein's position prevented them from being of any immediate service to their master, and endangered the contemplated retreat of the grand army from Smolensk, Buonaparte, before he left that place, had ordered them to drive the count back across the Dwina ; but Victor, who on the 14th attempted to execute these orders, was repulsed with great loss, and, followed by Wintenstein, fell back

towards the Beresina, with a view of being supported by the duke of Reggio (Oudinot.) Here, a few days afterwards, some time between the 22d and 24th, these two French generals were joined by the imperial fugitive, who, after the battle of the 17th, had escaped to Orsha; and left this last place on the 20th, bringing with him the miserable wrecks of his army, constantly pursued by the tremendous Platow. The French force, thus united, was estimated at upwards of 70,000 strong; and most of the troops being either just arrived, or exempt from the sufferings of the main army, were in good condition, and so well supplied with cavalry and artillery, as to make the odds rather against the Russians, harassed with fatigue, and exhausted in the incessant pursuit of the enemy. But at this critical juncture, admiral* Tchitchagoff—

* Admiral Tchitchagoff is upwards of 40 years of age, and was captain of a first rate man of war, when he had scarcely passed the age of twenty. As a volunteer in the British service, he was much distinguished for his talents and activity, and was unanimously considered by the British navy as one of the first naval officers in Europe. By his own merit he rose to his present rank, and was for some time minister of the marine, in which important office he

whose advanced guard, under count Lambert, had already defeated Dombrowsky on the 21st, and expelled him from Borissow after the loss of 3,100 prisoners, and 1,000 killed—appeared in that town, on the 24th, with the rest of his army ; and thus possessed himself of the road, by which Buonaparte intended to pass. In consequence of this, the contest in detail became very desperate ; but altogether against the French, as in the different attacks, from the 24th to the 27th, Wintenstein alone had taken from the enemy upwards of 13,000 prisoners, including Pantoureaux's division of 8,000 men, which, according to the 29th bulletin, had “ missed its

acquitted himself with great credit and ability. The want of opportunity to act on his own element ; the desire of contending with Buonaparte, of whose military talents he had an exalted idea ; and, above all, the ardent wish to serve his country, induced him, it seems, to seek the field of glory ; and his offers of service being immediately accepted, his new career proved as successful, as if he were a veteran, bred up in the camp. It may be truly said, that he is a man of few words, but eloquent in deeds ; dignified to his superiors ; familiar with his friends ; and affable to his inferiors. Russia cannot boast of a son more conspicuous for brilliant endowments, noble spirit, independent mind, and inflexible integrity.

way," and caused "the cruel loss of 2,000 infantry."

Buonaparte made several efforts to pass the Beresina at Borissow; but having failed in all, he went about ten miles higher, and finally, on the 27th, effected his passage with Oudinot's corps; leaving Victor behind, on the left bank of the river, to protect the bridge which was thrown over. At this time, Platow was at Borissow, in the rear of the French army; Wintenstein on the left bank of the Beresina, watching Victor's corps; and Tchitchagoff occupied the opposite bank, on the same side with Oudinot and Buonaparte. The three Russian generals being in communication with each other, Platow as it were forming the centre, and the other two the right and left wings, concerted a general attack, and, on the 28th, successfully carried their plan into execution. Tchitchagoff, being the nearest to the enemy, was the first to commence the attack upon Oudinot; Wintenstein, about half an hour after, fell upon Victor; and Platow co-operated with both, as occasion required. The battle terminated in a terrible and decisive defeat of the French. It was a finishing stroke to their hopes and fortunes; and the last expiring effort of the vanquished.

The 29th bulletin, in vain labours to conceal this last overthrow of Buonaparte, by pretending, that he found another shorter and better way to Wilna. It was evident, that, as his object, acknowledged in the same bulletin, was to go to Minsk, which commanded the main, and indeed the only road to Wilna or Warsaw, he was driven from it by Tchitchagoff, and compelled to fly across the country, where the elements for once befriended him ; for, if it had not been for the severe frost, he could never have passed the lakes and morasses, situated that way, and must have fallen into the hands of the Russians. It was also evident, that the doleful tone of the bulletin was caused by some new misfortunes, left untold, and subsequent to the battle of the 28th. Accordingly, by the later arrivals, we see the whole mystery developed ; the curtain is drawn up, and we are presented with a consummation of French disasters—a consummation which, were it not for the bulletin itself, the modesty of the preceding Russian accounts* would never

* Admiral Tchitchagoff's despatch of November 29th, says, that he drove the enemy back about 13 wersts, and was marching to Ostrowitz ; and it is

have led us to anticipate. Tchitchagoff, having driven the French army across the country, was pursuing them by the main road to Molodetchina; and Wintenstein, on the opposite side, was pushing through Velika to Wilna, in order to annoy the enemy in flank, and, if possible, to intercept him. Well might the bulletin be silent, as to the events that followed; for the passage of the Beresina alone cost the French 20,000 men; and the flight to Wilna, and its capture, cost them 20,000 more, besides the immense stores, magazines, upwards of 200 pieces of cannon, standards, and colours in abundance. Waggon, tumbrils, gun-carriages, carcasses, and wrecks of every description, in many places, choked up the roads, so as to make them absolutely impassable, and serve the enemy for a temporary defence. Buonaparte narrowly escaped with his life; and having, on the 5th of December, fled in disguise from the village of Teberhetzi, (Paris accounts agree exactly as to the time of his leaving the army, though not as to the circumstances,) the Russians, on the 10th of December, entered Wilna, as it were “on only by finding this place on the map, that *his marching* is ascertained to be in fact pursuing the enemy with irresistible vigour.

the shoulders of the enemy.” So rapid was their progress, that the French had not one moment to halt in the city, or to destroy their stores and magazines, collected there ; and when Davoust’s aid-de-camp was sent with orders to the rear, he found the whole captured and replaced by the Russian advanced guard, which made him also prisoner. Nay, scarcely had these fear-stricken fugitives left the town, than they were again overtaken by Platow, were cut off from the road to Warsaw, and beaten at Kawno with the loss of 6,000 prisoners ; so that, whether they direct their march to Königsberg, or to the interior of East Prussia,—and whether their number is more, or less than 13,000 men,—as long as they march in a body, they will be pursued, and must eventually surrender, or perish, before they reach the Vistula. It is impossible for any, but the stragglers, to escape beyond that river ; and the final doom of the melancholy remnant, now wandering at random, will be fixed before the new year can witness their misery.

The Baravian division, which was attached to Oudinot’s corps, has already surrendered to

major-general Kutuzow.* Regnier's corps is also said to have been taken ; and Macdonald, who had not moved from Courland, till the 12th of December, was already intercepted, and his Prussian troops remained with the Russians : the rest, if there be any left, will also fall into the hands of the conquerors. The prince of Swartzenburg is the only general, that may hope to save his men ; but as these are altogether Austrians, they are equally lost to Buonaparte. In short, the French army, the most numerous, and best appointed, that ever appeared, has been, in a little more than five months, swept from the earth. It exists no more, and is only remembered by the awful traces it left behind ; by the instructive lesson it has bequeathed to the

* This gallant officer, probably a relation of the field-marshal's, succeeded in command the brave Winzingerode, who was so active against Mojaïsk, and who retook Moskow ; but, urged by feelings of humanity to spare the garrison, imprudently advanced to a parley, and was treacherously seized. He was escorted by the French to Germany, when colonel Tchernisheff, in his extraordinary expedition from Volhynia to the Dwina, fell in with the escort, rescued the noble prisoner, and brought him to St. Petersburg.

world, and by the manifest and wonderful interposition of Providence, in favour of a people struggling in defence of their just and sacred rights.

It seems, as if the magnitude of object, and the immensity of preparation, were only designed to make failure and destruction proportionably extensive. No phenomenon was ever so portentous in its beginning, and so auspicious in its termination. Its first appearance was that of a baleful comet, or the huge eclipse, shedding "disastrous light" on the affrighted world; but its exit left a mild and unexpected radiance behind, which rejoices, and will continue to rejoice, the now respiring nations. No spectacle, at first so dismal and terrible, was more magnificent in its progress, and none was ever more brilliantly closed. The very ground which, five months since, had trembled beneath the daring and lawless foot of the boasting, insulting, and remorseless invader, now reposes beneath the congenial and well known tread of its legitimate owners. Poland receives again the Russian armies, and again sees their standards wave on her ramparts; but she expects peace and happiness, and fears not to be deceived. Instructed by the painful experi-

ence of the past, she returns to the bosom of her natural protector, with whom by custom, religion, language, and the same origin, she is closely and inseparably united.* Kutuzow, who entered Wilna on the 12th, forms the prominent character in this last and truly sublime scene. He seems the centre of motion, and the soul of action, while all around him is rapidity, order, harmony, and activity ; a combination of skill, discipline, and zeal, which makes each agent, in his particular sphere, equally great, and which renders any comparison, or discrimination of merit, impossible. All have done their duty ; all have deserved well of their country ; all have commanded the world's admiration ; and all, through the various changes of time, with joy and gratitude will be remembered by posterity.

Thus ends the most eventful tragedy that ever was performed on the world's stage ; a tragedy, where nations were spectators, where upwards of 700,000 men appeared as actors, where reality surpassed the poet's fruitful imagination, and where the invisible hand, which directed all, had disposed time, plot,

* It is a well known fact, that the Russian government always has been the most popular in Poland.

and incidents according to the established, and most approved rules of the drama. The previous correspondence, and the proclamation immediately preceding, form the prologue to the bloody business. From the middle of June, to the middle of August, the various movements and manœuvres, on both sides, make up the first act, and lay the foundation of the plot. From the 18th of August, beginning with the battle of Smolensko, to the 6th of September, is a second act ; where the plot is rising, and beginning slowly to shew itself. The third act commenced with the horrid battle of Borodino, on the 7th of September ; and though the change of fortune has actually taken place ; yet hopes and fears are so artfully balanced, that the interest increases, and expectation becomes more and more excited. The fourth act begins with Murat's defeat on the 18th of October, and the consequent evacuation of Moskow. Here, the great reverse assumes a decisive character ; the plot is ripened into explosion ; the causes, leading to the main catastrophe, are boldly and openly brought into action ; incidents thicken on incidents ; events follow each other in rapid and brilliant succession ; and the act

concludes with Buonaparte's entrance into Smolensko, on the 9th of November. The audience are now impatient for the fifth act; and at length it appears with the retreat from Smolensko, and the destruction of Davoust and Ney's corps, between the 17th and 18th of November. This is, as it ought to be, by far the busiest act. It impels the spectators along, and, gathering strength in its accelerated progress, it hurries them from scene to scene, until they reach the final catastrophe, scarcely sensible of the distance they have traversed. Here they pause, and here the hero of the piece delivers his last speech and confession (29th bulletin) retires to die (politically) behind the scenes, and leaves the subordinate actors to shift for themselves; who, one by one, quit the stage, and go where they can, stripped of their false ornaments, divested of their scenic grandeur, and restored to their native and original obscurity.

If a recapitulation of the principal events, and their effects, exhibited in the play, may with propriety enter into an epilogue, the tragedy in Poland will not be deficient in this particular; and here is the proof:

	Killed and wounded.	Prisoners.	Total.	Cannon.
<i>First Act.</i> —From June 22, to Aug. 17, comprising the actions of Mohilow, Romanow, Polotsk, Daunberg, and Ostrowno, cost the French	10,000	5,000	15,000	2
<i>Second Act.</i> —From Aug. 18, to Sept. 6, comprising the battles of Smolensko and Volontina	15,000	10,000	25,000	
<i>Third Act.</i> —From Sept. 7, to Oct. 17, comprising the battle of Borodino, which alone cost 60,000, and various encounters and skirmishes in the vi- cinity of Mojaisk and Moskow	60,000	10,000	70,000	16
<i>Fourth Act.</i> —From Oct. 18, to Nov. 9, comprising the battles of the Nara (Murat's), Gridnevo, Malojaraslavitz, Wiasma, Kolotz, Doroghowitchna, Douchowshtchina, Polotsk, and Kopyss . .	20,000	30,000	50,000	400

<i>Fifth Act.</i> —From Nov. 13, to Dec. 25, including the battles of Krasnoy, Kohanop, Borissov, Beresina, Molo- ditchno, Wilna, and Kowna . . .	31,000	91,000	122,000	600
	136,000	146,000	282,000	
Macdonald's corps	10,000	20,000	30,000	
Disease, famine, and frost, must have destroyed about	40,000		40,000	
	186,000	166,000	352,000	
Regnier's corps, destroyed, and Swartz- enburg's rendered useless			35,000	
The remnant, supposed to have escaped, but which will probably be taken . .			13,000	
Total, as calculated in the beginning .	186,000	166,000	400,000	1,018

The Russian returns seem to support this calculation ; but though it is impossible to make it accurate, without having all the items at command, yet, as the number of killed, and of those who perished by disease, famine, and cold, is not extravagant in proportion to the number of prisoners, which is more easily ascertained, there cannot be any material error as to the issue. The Russian accounts make also the number of cannon taken somewhat greater ; but the variation is not of sufficient importance ; and it is better to fall short, than to overrate the real amount. Waggon, baggage, standards, colours, and other trophies, taken in great quantities, could not be well enumerated, and are accordingly omitted. The loss of horses was not stated for the same reason, though, according to the 29th bulletin, 30,000 of them perished in a few days, and though the total loss, throughout this memorable campaign, could scarcely have been less than 150,000 ; 170,000 horses being the assumed proportion to 498,000 men, the amount, according to some calculations, of the whole French force, which is now no more. The 11th corps, under the duke of Castiglione (Augereau,) is supposed to have gone into Russian Poland at different times, to

reinforce the French armies. This supposition is very probable, from the good state of the French soldiers before the battle of Borissow, when they appeared quite fresh, and increased the French force beyond what was warranted by the knowledge of the small remains of the main army, and of repeated defeats, which reduced Victor's and Oudinot's corps to almost half their original numbers. If the 11th corps remained all this time in Prussia, then 400,000 men is not a sufficient estimate of the French army ; and, in such case, this same corps, distributed along the Vistula, might give pretext for stating the various positions* of the

* Paris papers pretend to give positions of the different corps, as if they had actually escaped ; but the slightest examination of the map will convince us that, either these corps are mere skeletons, consisting of a few officers, or that the statements are barefaced fabrications. Macdonald's corps, for instance, is placed on the Niemen, when, by his own account, all his Prussian troops had surrendered, or gone over ; and they, as can be proved from the former bulletins, composed his whole corps, with the exception of the staff and officers. From Wilna, which the French left on the 10th, to Warsaw, which is the nearest position stated, the distance is about 280 miles, and to Marienwarder, the farthest position, about 420 miles. The account is dated at Konigsburg on the 31st of

grand army, that *was*. Such was Buona-

December ; allowing, therefore, 3 days for Berthier to receive reports from the different corps, there remain only 17 days, to perform the march of 350 miles, taking that to be the average distance to the Vistula. At a season so severe, a body of men, exhausted and deprived of the proper means of conveyance,—whose quickest march from the Beresina to Wilna, was only at the rate of ten miles a day, when comparatively in a better condition,—never could go over the distance of 350 miles, at the rate of more than 20 miles a day. It is impossible ; and the necessity of such a fabrication confirms, if any confirmation were wanting, the total annihilation of the French armies. It is but a few weeks, since Paris papers announced, that Victor was at Myr and Slonim, and Buonaparte took Toula and Kaluga !!!

In proof of our statement of the numerical force of the French grand army, as it entered Russia, we give the names of the commanders of the 11 corps, each of which consisted of between 30 and 40,000 men:

King of Naples—(Murat, prince Joachim Napoleon.)

Viceroy of Italy—(Prince Eugene Beauharnois.)

Prince Eckmuhl—(Marshal Davoust.)

Duke of Belluno—(Marshal Victor.)

Duke of Castiglione—(Marshal Augereau.)

Duke of Dantzic—(Marshal Lefebre.)

Duke of Elchingen—(Marshal Ney.)

Duke of Istris—(Marshal Bessiers.)

Duke of Reggio—(Marshal Oudinot.)

Duke of Tarento—(Marshal Macdonald.)

Duke of Treviso—(Marshal Mortier.)

parte's own expression, when he announced the annihilation of Moskow.

NOW that the spectators have retired with different impressions, according to their feelings, passions, and interest, it may not be improper or presumptuous to cast a look into futurity, and to discover, if possible, in the regions of Time, as yet unexplored, the different routes and paths, which various nations will probably take, in consequence of the great events they have witnessed. The questions, which naturally suggest themselves, are these :

1. How far will Russia follow up her successes ?
2. What will be the conduct of the European nations ?
3. How far will Buonaparte be able to check the Russians, and preserve his allies ?

FIRST, then, how far will Russia follow up her successes ?

The policy of Alexander is open and manly, soaring above mean intrigue, and low subterfuge. He honestly declared to the

world, that the restoration of the Prussian monarchy to its independence and integrity was essential to his interests, as it would form a bar of separation between his and the French empire. He also made it known through Kutuzow, that no peace can, or shall be made, until the French have repassed the Vistula. Therefore, when it is considered, that this comes from an emperor, who has just redeemed the pledge, given to his people, of “never sheathing his sword, as long as a single enemy remained on his territories ;” it cannot be doubted, but he will pursue the enemy beyond the Vistula,—to Berlin,—and further, if necessary,—to rescue, in the first instance, the king and kingdom of Prussia from thralldom ; and thus inflict a noble vengeance on the shade of Frederic the Great, whose jealousies and hatred of the Russian nation, and whose unworthy conduct towards the founder of the Russian empire,* are an indelible stain on his own memory.

* There is scarcely a story, ever so absurd and humiliating to Peter the Great, which Frederic had not invented or circulated, and forced into public belief by the weight of his own authority and character. It seems, he foresaw, that Peter’s works would prove much more solid than his own ; and full of en-

The well-known disposition of Alexander, whose ambition is, to be the pacificator, and not the conqueror of the world ; his extreme reluctance to shed human blood, even in cases of necessity ; and the vast expenses and sacrifices attending a foreign war, might induce us to believe, that he would not in any event advance beyond the Elbe : but, on the other hand, his wisdom, and the dearest interests of his country, will not permit him to throw away the advantages he has acquired ; to allow the enemy to recover breath ; and be, at the end, compelled to go through the same process, in order to re-purchase the same advantages. Delay, being favourable to the enemy, is of course prejudicial to himself ; and, in the present circumstances, would be a grievous fault, almost irreparable. It is probable, therefore, that the Russian emperor will pursue the war, until the Rhenish confederacy is broken, the duke of Oldenburg restored to his dominions, Holland rescued from her bon-

vy and malice, set every engine at work to defame his deeds, and tarnish his character. The injury he had thus committed on the memory of a man, far greater than himself, was so great, that not ail his subsequent half-way recantations could ever repair it.

dage, all the ports in the north of Europe are opened to commerce, and an honourable, general peace is obtained and established on a permanent basis.

The Rhenish confederates, who groan under French oppression, are mostly related to the emperor. The dukes of Weimar, Baden, Mecklenburg, and others, connected with him by family ties, which nothing but the predominant power of France could break for a moment, all entertain strong hopes and expectations of being delivered by him ; and he will not abandon them, when Providence has now bestowed on him the enviable power to save ; and when not to save, would shew his unconsciousness of his great destiny. He will protect them for the same reason, that he protects the king of Prussia and the duke of Oldenburg, who are likewise his relations.

As to his views of conquest, they do not extend beyond Poland. It would, however, be a just reward for his exertions, and a beneficial exchange to the inhabitants themselves, to leave him in possession of the country, as far as the Vistula, and of the Austrian part of Poland. He might then proclaim himself king of Poland, unite and consolidate the peo-

ple, and gratify their pride by shewing to the world, that, as a nation, they are still in existence. It is of the partition of their country among the different powers,—separating, as it were, brother from brother, and father from son,—and not of dependence upon any one in particular, that they have chiefly complained. It is also certain, that, if they were left to their own choice, they would unanimously prefer the protection of Russia, because she is more able to defend them; and because her government, wisely and mildly administered, was rendered still more popular by local prejudices, in her favour; prejudices, which arise, as was already mentioned, from the similarity of language, customs, and other circumstances.*

* This has been amply proved in the last and present campaign, when the attachment of the Polish peasantry to Russia withstood Buonaparte's most alluring promises, and when defection could not be extended beyond the circle of nobles, who by the conquest of Poland lost their power of oppression, and, under the surreptitious form of liberty, excited the sympathies of the world in favour of themselves,—in favour of cruel and multiplied tyranny, which had the power of life and death over every poor vassal, subjected to their despotic sway. The placing of the Polish upon the same footing with the Russian serfs, was in fact a deliverance, a comparative liberty and

Prussia, for the loss of her part, might be easily indemnified in Saxony, whose king, if we except the elector of Bavaria, is the most attached to France, and therefore may justly be treated like an enemy. Austria also, would think herself amply paid, for the loss of her share, by the recovery of her German and Italian states, which she can easily do with the assistance of Russia. To shew, that such an event is the most probable, it is necessary to mention, that in the last campaign (1806, 1807) general Beningsen, on his own responsibility, wished to proclaim Alexander as king of Poland : and his not doing so, though it was uncertain whether the emperor would, or would not, sanction the project, was considered by many, as an unfortunate omission.

happiness to the former : for the Russian serf is protected in his life, his religion, and his personal property ; and any violation of the laws, which thus protect him, subjects the violator, whoever he be, to the same punishment, as if the injury were done to his equal. In truth, the Russian serf is only a tenant for life : and even this restriction is now removing by a gradual and wisely arranged system of emancipation. Poland, therefore, in being conquered, has been rescued from tyranny and miseries unexampled, and, were it now in her power, nothing would induce her to resume her former condition.

SECONDLY, what will be the conduct of the European nations ?

Prussia will unquestionably join Russia, both from good will, and from the force of circumstances. From France she experienced nothing but disgrace and oppression ; from Russia, she has known nothing but kindness and friendship, and now from her alone she can expect safety, protection, and the restoration of her lost independence. She cannot hesitate for a moment between a deadly foe, who has thirsted for her ruin, and a faithful friend, who has shed his blood in her defence. The Prussians hold the French in abhorrence ; they do not think themselves fairly conquered ; and pant for an opportunity of vindicating that military character, for which they were so celebrated in Frederic's time, and the supposed loss of which is most galling to their pride—a source of constant humiliation, to remove which they would spare neither blood nor treasure.

They are not, besides, corrupted by French influence, like their German brethren ; and still have virtue, talent, and patriotism enough to deliver their country from ignominious bondage. They want but an impulse, and Russia is destined to give it. D'Yorke's

convention with the Russian general, is a certain pledge of their hearty co-operation in their own cause, and it is not in the power of Buonaparte to check them. If he restores their king, the presence of their sovereign, whose present language is only the language of restraint, not of the heart, will animate them to greater exertion ; but if the tyrant should remove him, they will be the more incensed, and stimulated to revenge. Be it as it may, they will receive the Russians as friends and brothers, and will open to them their towns, their houses, and their arms, with most cordial welcome. Memel has already shewn the example ; Königsberg, Dantzic, and other towns will shortly follow it ; and not a single Prussian will, from choice, appear in arms against his country's deliverers. The king, if he ever should escape from the French guard, placed over him, will prove worthy of his subjects, and largely share in their ardour and sympathies. If he ever erred, his misfortunes are a sufficient expiation ; and his personal attachment to the emperor of Russia, strengthened by mutual esteem and consanguinity, will not suffer him to relapse. It is true, however, that, like other men whom fortune has forsaken, he was

censured with more asperity than justice, and was altogether denounced for the transgressions of his father, who, it cannot be denied, did not faithfully adhere to his engagements, and was in every respect a different character. The present king, whatever may be the standard of his talents, yields to none in probity and honour. The downfall of the coalition in 1805, so uniformly and unjustly attributed to him, originated altogether with Austria, whose premature opening of the campaign, and impolitic invasion of Bavaria,—which terminated in the cowardly and treacherous surrender of Mack,—made it impossible for the Prussians to arrive seasonably enough to retrieve the destructive state of affairs. The field, in fact, was taken long before the time stipulated between the coalesced powers ; and though the Russians, by forced marches, came up sooner, yet the battle of Austerlitz, and the weakness (not to say perfidy) of the Austrian councils had decided the contest, before the king of Prussia arrived. It was his sincerity in the common cause, that provoked all his subsequent disasters, by incensing Buonaparte, and exciting him to that dreadful vengeance, which, in a short time, made Prussia a dependent and mutilated state, and her mon-

arch a beggar and a prisoner. The principal error this unfortunate king committed, was precisely the same which, on the part of Austria, had ruined the above coalition ; that is, being too confident, or too eager for glory to divide it with the Russians, he met the enemy, before they came to his assistance. Experience has taught him now the value of his friends ; and henceforth he will place implicit confidence in their councils and professions. It is only, as their steady and faithful adherent, that he can preserve the interest and the safety of his country. If he should however be carried off,—a measure rather probable in Buonaparte's present desperate condition,—Prussia, even by a stronger link, will be united to the destinies of Russia.

With regard to AUSTRIA, it is evident, from the preceding paragraph, that a conjecture on her future conduct would be very hazardous ; not because a princess of her house is married to Buonaparte—this relationship is more likely to prove a source of discord ; or, if not, Alexander's influence, from the same source, is more than equal in Germany—but because, under the long and habitual ascendancy of the French, her sense of honour is deadened, and she has, by degrees,

accustomed herself to hear the clanking of her chains with comparative indifference. Her spirit is broken ; and she is in the situation of a slave, who, instead of resisting the tyrant that lashes him, finds his only consolation in seeing others suffer like himself. She resembles an abandoned woman, who hates chastity in others, merely because she has lost her own ; and it is therefore probable, that the successes of the Russians, by reminding her of her own defeats, may give her more pain, than even the deep wounds which Buonaparte has inflicted on her. She cannot be unconscious, that she is the principal cause of her own and Europe's prostration, and may prefer, perhaps, to fall rather by her own hand, than be raised by that of another. The more she knows her own defects, the more she wishes to have them concealed, and the greater is her mortification in being reminded of them by strangers. Being the nearest of the great continental powers, she was first of all assailed with the poison of the French revolution,—with every subsequent exhalation from that hot-bed of corruption ;—and the effect was no where so rapid, and so fatally extensive. Her government, in a short time, became a putrid mass, which infected all with-

in its reach : and her nobles fell so low, from their former pride and dignity, that a princess of the imperial house stooped voluntarily, nay, thought it an honour* to offer her person to the polluted embrace of a vile usurper, robber, and murderer ; while a prince, her relation, and formerly a hero,† presided at the

* Louisa Theresa is said to have loved Buonaparte before she saw him ! !—The Russian princess, whom he first solicited, rejected him with indignation ; and her conduct was approved by her mother (the empress dowager) and her imperial brother.

† The Archduke Charles, who degraded himself forever, by thus administering to the tyrant's ambition and lustful pleasures. He, at least, might have declined the office. What a contrast is this to the behaviour of the Russian generals ?—After the peace of Tilsitz, Buonaparte expressed a wish to see the celebrated Beningsen, who so successfully opposed him ; and being refused, he sent him the order of the legion of honour, which the latter immediately returned with this emphatic reply, " I am not conscious of having done any thing to deserve this honour."

Several French generals and officers wished also to pay their respects to the venerable Platow, hetman of the Cozaks ; but when they approached his tent, and requested his permission to enter, he sent them the following answer : " There may be peace and friendship between the sovereign my master, and the French emperor ; but there is no peace and friendship between me and Frenchmen." Accord-

unhallowed rites, and personated the monster, to whom she was sacrificed. It is true, that this humiliation was not instantaneous, and the remaining spirit of ambition occasionally broke out in open resistance ; but it was the struggle of a person, who expects to sink, and who takes up arms with no resolution to persevere, and with no hopes to conquer, but rather with a view to reconcile himself and others to his final submission. It was the impulse of the moment, subsiding almost as soon as it was excited. Austria began sometimes too soon, sometimes too late ; but always finished at the critical moment, when it was ruin not to go on. She slept on the highway ; awoke only with the rude shake of the intruding traveller ; and, at each interval, when he relaxed his hold, she reclosed her eyes, and dreamed away the time, which she should have employed in activity.* There was a want

ingly, they were all turned off without seeing the hero, except on the field of battle. The shrugging of a shoulder, and " C'est un barbare," were the only palliatives to their mortification.

* As an instance of this apathy, it has been said, and generally believed, that while Alexander was exposing his person in the cause of his friend, the emperor of Austria, in the battle of Austerlitz, the

of foresight in her councils, languor in her efforts, heaviness in her motion, unsteadiness in her designs, and weakness in the execution. Instead of forming a circle round her, which none should approach with impunity, or of being the lion in his own forest, she waited till she was trod upon, and contented herself with a temporary display of impotent anger, tending to encourage, rather than repel, the lawless aggressor. In short, insolence in prosperity, meanness in adversity, and perfidy in both,* have for the last fifteen years charac-

good emperor himself was seated on a beautiful verdant bank, and amused himself the whole day with fishing, until his sport was interrupted by the unwelcome news of the battle having terminated rather differently from what he expected !

* Lest this language should be deemed too severe, and not founded on justice, the reader must be reminded, that it was *insolence*, which made her grasp at conquests in Italy, when the Russians became masters of that country in 1799 ; that it was *meanness*, which made her since submit with patience to every indignity from France ; that it was *perfidy in prosperity*, which made her desert Suwarow in Switzerland; and that it was *perfidy in adversity*, which made her an indifferent spectator of the last, and an enemy in the present contest in Poland ; a contest, which threatened destruction to the generous ally, who never yet appeared in arms against her, but readily

terised her political conduct. Upon the score of friendship, therefore, of good policy, or of and repeatedly shed his best blood in her defence ; a contest, in which she had it twice in her power,—for she was not, like Prussia, disabled, subdued, and chained to the conqueror's car,—to decide the fate of Buonaparte, by interposing her force between him and France ; a contest, indeed, the successful issue of which would have sealed her own total and instantaneous annihilation ; and, therefore, by sacrilegiously contributing her aid to it, she added madness to perfidy. But her base ingratitude to Suwarow,—to him who had saved her army on the river Rimnick from certain destruction, and by whose arms she had recovered all Italy in one summer,—never can, never will, never ought to be forgotten. By mean intrigue, she snatched him from the arms of victory in Italy, and sent him over to Switzerland, at a most unfavourable season, without provision, artillery, or even draught horses, so that he was forced to employ his cavalry for that purpose. For all these necessities, he was referred from town to town ; but every where found nothing, but empty promises. To finish the whole, and to prove, that he was sent expressly to be sacrificed, the Austrian troops withdrew from Zurich before he came there, treacherously abandoning the position, which it was understood they would maintain until his arrival. In consequence of this, he found himself, at the head of 16,000 men, surrounded by a French army of at least 60,000, amidst mountains, and in narrow defiles, where there was no path to choose, where eve-

honour, nothing can be expected from her. It is as likely, that she may take the part of her direct foe against her best friend, as that she may join the latter against the former. It is

ry pass was occupied by the enemy, and not above four men abreast could march forward. Nothing but Providence and his genius could have rescued him from such a perilous situation ; and by these he was rescued. His victorious and matchless retreat, by far the most brilliant of his achievements, made him conqueror of the French even after his death, by the contrast it left to the miserable, disgraceful, and destructive flight of the boaster, who has since, like him, been called "Invincible," but not, like him, worthy of the title. Suwarow, anticipating a speedy dissolution of the coalition, if the treacherous proceedings of Austria were divulged, concealed them as long as was possible ; and his doing so, was the chief cause of the emperor Paul's displeasure. But when the Austrian cabinet, perceiving the Russians upon the retreat, became sensible of its folly, and archduke Charles was commissioned to propitiate Paul, through the medium of the Russian commander ; the first time that the archduke requested an interview, Suwarow replied, "At Vienna I shall throw myself at his highness's feet, but here, I am field marshal like himself ; only much older :" and when the second request was made, he drily said, "An old soldier like myself, can only once be deceived ;" and put an end to all expectations of his interference.

Of baron Thugut, the prime minister, and the sup-

equally probable, that her jealousy of Russia's future progress may overbalance the pain and mortification from the already experien-

posed cause of Austrian duplicity, Suwarow observed, in one of his rhyming humours,

“ He, worse than all the rest,
Keeps scribbling in his nest,
And thinks to do by writing,
What must be done by fighting.”

The manner in which every treacherous attempt turned to the advantage of Russia, and to the punishment of her false friend, shews the interposition of Providence so clearly, that some instances deserve to be mentioned here :

The desertion of Suwarow by the Austrians increased his glory, and that of the Russian arms.

His death, accelerated by the chagrin of being obliged, through the machinations of Austria, to abandon the object of his brilliant, laborious campaign, shewed the world, that Russia possessed more than one great general.

The very French army, from the pursuit of which Suwarow was prematurely recalled to Switzerland, and whose destruction was thus left unfinished, deprived Austria, the next spring, at once of her conquests and glory, on the plains of Marengo.

The ungenerous conduct of all the continental nations, and chiefly of Austria, in forsaking Russia at the moment of danger, only made the latter reap the full harvest of glory, and possess the undivided spoils of victory.

ced progress of France ; and that she may trust to the false promises of Buonaparte, more than to the sincerity of Alexander, who has never yet deceived any one. Some other clue must, therefore, be found to her future policy, and the probable conduct she may adopt. It can only be found in her fears, and in her inability to check the progress of the Russians. Prussia, by operating against her on one side, and Turkey on the other, will confine her entirely to the defence of her own territory ; and enable Russia to bend her whole force to the prosecution of the war with France. If Austria therefore takes the part of France, her Polish possessions will be lost without an equivalent : but if she thinks, that her arms furnish better means to repossess herself of the Italian states, and extend her power to the Mediterranean,—an object of great interest to her,—she will join Russia, and be, for once, on the right side of the question. This is certainly the course of wisdom ; for with Russia she can be what she was, and with France she will be less than she is. Nevertheless, as she may not wish to assist Russia, and will not dare to oppose her ; and as she may hope, while the two great nations are contending, to recover breath, and thus by de-

grees regain her importance among the nations,—the most probable conclusion is, that she will remain neutral.

SWEDEN will pursue the same course ; because, in a country where a legitimate sovereign was deposed on account of his warlike disposition, a stranger, who succeeded him, must altogether depend for his popularity on his undeviating preference of peace. England and Russia understood well the situation of Bernadotte, and appeared perfectly satisfied with his neutrality, as long as he made demonstrations, which he did, of invading Germany, and thus, by distracting the force and attention of the French, produced as much effect as, if he had actually embarked in the projected expedition. If Sweden, however, wishes to recover Pomerania, she must, of necessity, act with Russia and England : indeed, from her geographical situation, she has no other choice than to be the ally of both, and no other chance of prosperity.

DENMARK, whether she wishes, or not, must follow in the train of the northern powers ; she will however wait, as long as she can, to see which side is likely to prevail in Germany. She has been a mere tool, a miniature of France and the satellite of Buona-

parte, whose acts of plunder and piracy she has been aping to the utmost of her insignificant power. It is of very little consequence which way she goes, provided she does not continue privateering against the commercial property in the Baltic—for then she will find, to her cost, that her power of doing mischief is of short duration ; and that Holstein and Norway, perchance, may be disposed of, not exactly to her liking.

The RHENISH CONFEDERATION, or princes composing it,—tho' they are tired of being less than the prefects of Buonaparte,—though they hail with joy their prospect of deliverance, and are inclined, from family connexions as well as other motives, to favour the Russian interest,—are so weak, that they will not dare to stir, until the French shall have left them, or the Prussians, if not Russians, shall have entered their territories. Then they certainly will. The fallen tyrant of Europe, as he recedes towards France, will multiply his enemies ; and Russia will find new friends, as she advances from her own territories.

TURKEY, by her recent conduct, has most unequivocally shewn her preference of Russian to French alliance ; and was the only power, that did not desert Russia. As there

is no doubt but her adherence to the Russian cause proceeded from an anticipation of its success ; such adherence must be now strengthened by the fears of provoking the prodigiously augmented power of Russia ; and by a desire of conciliating her emperor, who knows how to estimate and remember good offices. The Turkish divan are perfectly acquainted with the character of Alexander ; and are aware, that to be upon friendly terms with him is their best security ; and that, as long as they do not compel him to measures of hostility, he will not injure them. For these reasons, Turkey certainly will be on the side of Russia ; and, as was before observed, will take the field, and is actually engaged, by treaty, to take it against Austria, the moment the latter should make a serious demonstration against Russia. If Austria, contrary to all expectation, should join France, the whole of Europe will be in flames, and divided into two parties ; that is, France and Austria, on one side, will have to contend with Russia, Prussia, Turkey, and perhaps Sweden on the other ; Austria, however, with all her imprudence, is not likely to take such a step.

Of GREAT-BRITAIN very little can be said; her policy and conduct being less subject to change and speculation. She is the natural ally of Russia, and profits, more than any other power, by the Russian successes. All her channels of European commerce will be restored; and her prosperity, from the intercourse with the continent, will be revived with greater vigour than ever, as the tyranny of the French, and the desolation caused by their wars and decrees, have annihilated continental manufactures, and therefore prodigiously increased the demand upon England. The groundwork of the restrictive system, operating against her, will be entirely destroyed; and it will be completely in her power, by using her advantages with wisdom and moderation,—by adding to her own naval power the influence or mediation of Russia,—to turn her enemies to friends, or to entail on them exclusively all the losses and calamities of war.

THE LAST QUESTION, *how far France will be able to check the progress of the Russians?* it would take a volume to answer. Suffice it therefore to observe, that France is not in a condition to exert herself with her former success. The incessant and ruinous wars, in

which she has been for a series of years involved ; the enormous and wanton waste of blood and treasure ; the total stagnation of commerce, and the consequent reduction of her national resources, at the moment when her necessities have increased in double proportion ; have so embarrassed her finances, and exhausted her effective population, as to render her efforts comparatively feeble, and unavailing. This is no dream, no rash, vain, and extravagant anticipation ; but an absolute fact, which the first trial will establish beyond all possibility of doubting. It will soon be seen, that she is not half so able now to defend herself, even at home, as she was ten years ago. It will be seen, that her brilliant career, rich in unsubstantial triumphs, but poor in solid advantages, was undermining her vital strength, and propelling her back to relative impotence. It will be seen, that, by persecuting commerce, she has punished herself much more, than her tributary nations—infinately more than England—and has inflicted a fatal blow on her own prosperity. The system of exaggeration,* for many years success-

* Mr. D'Invernois, in his "*Napoleon l'administrateur*," incontestibly proves from official sources, from the payment actually made, that the French ar-

fully pursued by her—which overawed the weak and timid, checked the strong and daring, and imposed upon the world at large—cannot last for ever ; and the illusion it created will soon be broken, when her real strength will appear much below its general estimate. There was an artificial splendour thrown around her, which bedazzled the mind, and diverted it from contemplating the substance itself. She appeared like some object looming at sea, and diminishing in size as it is approached ; or, to speak more pointedly, she was in the state of the human body, diseased with dropsy, where the enlargement of external parts was mistaken for a symptom of health and vigour.

mies, so often announced at 800,000 men, never exceeded 400,000 men ; that, though their annual maintainance increased in expense, owing to the depreciation of property, their numerical or effective strength was not augmented ; and that, consequently, the military power of France was not greater then, (before the last campaign,) than it was in the time of Louis XIV. The aid of the allies, or rather the vassals, may have swelled the number in appearance ; but this is an aid, that requires as much to get and keep it, as it is worth ; and is apt, as Buonaparte soon will find, to break out in ulcers all over the body.

Her conscriptive system,—the parent of fallacious theories†—which, even in the eyes of distinguished men, men whose talents and labours are an honour to their country, gave her a magic superiority over all the rest, was only the effect of unnatural irritation ; producing an extraordinary exertion, which must inevitably be followed by correspondent lassitude and weakness. It was the speed of a race-horse, galled by the spur, or excited by ambition, beating all the rest upon a short distance, but finally giving way to a common well-conditioned animal, proceeding with his regular pace. A vast body of water can only be kept together by an equilibrium, or by its outlet being proportionate to its inlet ; but if, by the breaking down of the bank, or any other cause creating an unusual impulse, its regular channel of egress should swell into an overwhelming torrent, the streams, which feed the main body, cannot supply the deficiency quick enough, and the whole must be, sooner

† It is singular, that those, who, upon such theories, supported the *irresistibility* of France, had entirely overlooked that in Prussia the same system was rigorously and habitually enforced ; and yet no other power, that pretended to military distinction, was ever so easily and rapidly overthrown.

or later exhausted. So it is with the French conscription, which becomes less and less productive every year. In ordinary times it has only been sufficient to repair the annual losses of the army ; and in the late terrible, though, in appearance, most prosperous wars, it could only supply the deficiency by anticipation. How impoverished then, and how inadequate must be this source, after such a campaign, as the last ; a campaign, which must accelerate the issue of the previous concurrent and debilitating causes ; terminate the feverish energy, imparted by the revolution ; throw France back, weak and exhausted after the paroxysm, into her natural state ; and to produce that consummation of disasters, which she was for some time approaching, but which was hid from the inattentive spectator, by the imposing splendour of her triumphs.

The *consummation of disasters* is not meant here to imply the downfall and total dissolution of France ; but that critical state, in which, her wings being clipped, and her claws drawn out, the whole body is so enfeebled, that years of peace and rest can only restore her, and one violent attack more would be fatal to her existence. The nation, which could

bear so much reduction, must still be strong, like a man of robust constitution, who may even in his illness overcome a healthy adversary of weaker frame ; nevertheless, her power of conquest is destroyed, and her ability to defend herself is so far impaired, as to render her safety doubtful, and the capture of Paris by the Russians much more probable, than the marching of the French to St. Petersburg. For it cannot be doubted, but the Russians, in case France persists in rejecting all terms of accommodation, will pursue her broken legions, even to her capital—to the very heart of her own empire. If they do so, and they must, unless peace prevents them ; they must conquer in spite of all predictions to the contrary, as the chances are reversed, and doubled in their favour. France, in 1799, was much stronger than she is now, and her armies were entire ; and yet the Russians, who invaded her at that time, were prevented from marching to Paris, merely by a disagreement between Paul and the Austrian cabinet. Her resistance, therefore, would be feeble indeed, when, besides the invading force being ten times greater, her own resources are diminished, and her armies swept from the face of the earth.

France cannot recover her loss in Poland. It is not merely the men, who composed her army, that she has lost ; but all the physical and moral means, indispensable for its support, were also destroyed. It was a nation sunk at once. It was embarking the capital and the interest in a hazardous voyage, on which no insurance was made, but all was trusted to the superior strength of the vessel ; and then losing both by a sudden wreck, from which neither planks enough to build a boat, nor men enough to navigate it, could be saved. The ruined merchant, however, has in this case, so far the advantage, that, if his credit be good at home, he may get assistance, embark in some new enterprize, and by one lucky turn, recover all ; whereas France, whose finances are too embarrassed to relieve her poverty, has no credit whatever. Who will trust her ? Of whom will she borrow, when her own merchants are ruined, and and when strangers, whom she affects to consider as friends, no longer dread her power, which had already extorted from them the greatest part of their property ? Will the runaway dukes and marshals open their private purses, and will Napoleon, or his rapacious ex-empress Josephine, empty the treasure

out of their private coffers ? They may do so, rather than be driven from their “ bad eminence ;” but the resource is precarious, insufficient, and at best, of a transient nature. Unless, therefore, Buonaparte has the magic power to make war without money, call up his dead warriors from their graves in Poland, or create new ones, by sowing the dragon’s teeth upon the field ; he can as easily stop the motion of the earth, as check the progress of the Russians, or, by preserving his allies, preserve his own power.* Peace, speedy peace, is his only remedy.

* Buonaparte’s plain intimation, that he cannot well defend himself, without the assistance of his allies, is contained in the following extract from the report of the French minister of exterior relations, dated Paris, January 9th. “ With the garrisons of places in France and *Italy*, your majesty has therefore, in the interior of your *states*, a force more than *sufficient* to maintain the war *with Russia* for the *approaching* campaign ; and your intention, sire, was not deemed any *extraordinary* assistance, *if all your allies, and especially Austria, Denmark, and Prussia remained faithful to the common cause.*”

The words *Italy and states*, mean, that France is obliged to speculate on the assistance of nations conquered by her ; a most promising speculation ! ! The words, *sufficient, with Russia*, (instead of *in Rus-*

That he will endeavour to make a show of force, in hopes of keeping his allies in awe, is most certain ; but that he will dare to meet the Russians half way, or that he can expect to frighten them from their purpose, whatever it may be, is extremely improbable. What force can he now bring against them into the field, with any prospect of success ? Of the

sia) approaching, and extraordinary, are all so many admissions, that France apprehends an attack upon herself, and dares not even think of an offensive war. Indeed, since Buonaparte's return, he has not given the least hint of such an event being contemplated, or even considered as possible.

The remaining part of the extract is a volume of open confessions, and places the safety of France on a contingency, which cannot, and will not take place. What right has Napoleon to expect, that nations trampled on by him, will continue faithful to his interest, when they can trample upon him in turn ; or that they have more affection for their ruthless oppressor, than for their deliverer ? He may be assured, that interest and natural passions are the same in nations, as in individuals ; and that if his safety depend upon Prussia, Denmark, and Austria, he is gone past all recovery. His quick sensibility as to Austria, and his extreme solicitude to convince the world, that she received the British ambassador with coolness, show his great fears of her desertion, and even of her joining Russia in open war.

whole French army, never materially exceeding 400,000 men, 250,000 (the stated proportion of Frenchmen) sacrificed in Poland; 100,000 toiling in Spain; and about 50,000 dispersed in various parts of Germany and Italy, to keep the *faithful allies* in obedience,—make up the whole number, and leave scarcely the substance of a regular army in the interior of France. The Spanish war, which was undermining his resources, even before he went to Russia, by being a constant and heavy expense to him, without any plunder in return, to enable him, as was the case in other places, to rivet the chains of slavery by the hands of the victims themselves; must still employ his famishing troops there, and he dares not, at least, will not, recal them, until he is driven to the last extremity of confessing to the world the real incompetency of his means at home. He knows too well, that by such a step, he would invite lord Wellington's attack upon some vital parts of France; and therefore thinks it best to defend himself in Spain; cunningly turning the measure of necessity into an appearance of defiance and triumph. The recal of troops from that country, would be the most conclusive, and the greatest proof imaginable,

of his despair, and of his want of confidence in his 350,000 conscripts and militia men, so exultingly announced in all the papers. 350,000 men, and no more, when a great “display of force”* is so indispensable—and when, according to the constant practice of exaggerating in prosperous times, and with less motive, the whole must have been estimated, at least, one half above its real number—is a pitiful force, and a terrible falling off from the 800,000 men, that had so often appeared on paper, and made the world tremble. But let him

* In the same report of January 9th, the French minister expressly says : “ By this *immense display* of forces, the *interest*, the *consequence of France*, and the *safety of its allies*, will be guarded against all events,” implying thereby, the repetition of the preceding sentiments and apprehensions, that the safety of France is endangered ; that the faith of the allies is insecure ; and that France can scarcely hope to defend herself at home against the storm which threatens her.

As soon, indeed, as Buonaparte returned, the senate, in their address to him, on the 25th of December, spoke of the zeal of Frenchmen being capable “ to snatch from the influence of their enemies, the different parts of the continent ;” which is a fair acknowledgment, that the continent is, or will be lost to them, in consequence of their inability to resist the victorious arms of the Russians.

have it all as he states it ; let it be supposed probable, that a man, who never told truth when falsehood was altogether unprofitable, should tell truth now, when falsehood is so essential to his interest ; and what then ? Is his militia, pompously called “ cohorts,” and intended only for home defence, but now forced to make *an offer* of their services for other purposes, any proof of his being well provided with regular troops, or of his being able and willing to march against the Russians far beyond his own frontiers ? Or are his conscripts, forming the remainder, mere boys, and raw recruits, the specimen of the immense effective force still left him ? Can these, with their looks, appal the victorious veterans ? Will he dare to meet, can he hope to overcome the Russian warriors, who have destroyed his best troops, with these beardless striplings ; who, unless prevented by the bayonet behind, will run away at the sight of a Cozak ? No ! He must first raise them, then drill them, and ask the Russians not to kill the poor creatures, until they are grown in size and discipline.

TO RAISE THEM in numbers sufficient to fill up the dreadful chasm, made by the last campaign, is impracticable, on account of the

previous great scarcity of young men, caused by the merciless scythe of war and conscription. But, supposing it to be practicable, the measure itself is a very hazardous experiment, being peculiarly oppressive at this moment. The loss of 250,000 men, in so short a time, must have made mourners of many parents ; and yet, while their hearts are bleeding with the wounds just inflicted, they are called upon to deliver up their remaining sons to the same untimely and horrible fate. It is not in human nature to bear such misery with patience ; and there is no sacrifice, no self-devotion of which a parent is not capable, in defence of his offspring. The young men too must enter the service with prospects and emotions very different from those, which heretofore were wont to animate them. Their confidence in their chief is now destroyed ; and the magic spell of his name, which decoyed them to the jaws of death, while it petrified their enemies, is now dissolved forever. He has been so completely disgraced, compelled to so infamous a flight—for there was nothing in his retrograde progress deserving the name of retreat—that of his former military reputation, he has not saved enough to assure the soldier, that in case of adverse fortune,

the talents of his general would, at least, save his honour. A loss of name like this, is the most grievous and fatal, that can happen to any commander. The imagination of the young conscript, under such an impression, no longer soars like an eagle, over the ocean of futurity ; but, like a timorous dove, hastily turns away, and scarcely dares to cast a single look behind. His terror and despondency are in proportion to that youthful ardour, that fearless ignorance, and those buoyant hopes, which were formerly his conductors to the field of battle. He is now fully informed of the danger that awaits him, and views it in its real frightful aspect ; for there is no protecting and kindly deceiving phantom to step between, and cover it with its gorgeous veil. Instead of the wide and tempting road, bestrewed with laurel leaves, and leading through the golden regions of glory ; he sees a rugged path, overgrown with prickly thorns, conducting from one precipice to another, and lost amidst the graves, from which the spectres of his brethren and countrymen rise up to warn him of his doom. Against the enemy, of whom he cannot now even think without trembling, he expects no success ; but if he should conquer, a still greater mise-

ry awaits him on the snowy plains of Poland. With such prepossessions, therefore, as these, the conscripts will not be of much service to Buonaparte.

TO DRILL THEM, is also a difficult though indispensable task ; for the very sinews of the army, its props, its guides, its instructors, its moving springs, and its chief strength, are gone with the inferior officers ; all those, who connected the head with the extremities, or the soul with the body, and made a harmonious whole. Another French army, so entirely new, and raised, as it were, within one century of the former, would be deprived even of the benefit of tried courage, and the well practised arm, by which an old soldier so often sustains his younger comrade, who has not yet shaken hands with “grim-visag’d” danger. Time alone can make such troops efficient ; but then the Russians are not complaisant or foolish enough to grant them the wished-for indulgence.

The exalted idea, however, that many have not ceased to entertain of the personal abilities of Buonaparte, excites apprehension, that he still will be able to repair his disasters, and even to act with vigour on the offensive. Some have gone so far, as to deem his person-

al escape sufficient to counterbalance the loss of his whole army ; and some, advancing still further, have declared, that of the two alternatives, the safety of his army was less dangerous to the world, than the safety of his own person. To all these a very short answer can be given.

Buonaparte is a mortal, and therefore cannot do that, which omnipotence alone can effect.... repair the unexampled disasters, that, with one fell sweep, made his myriads disappear, and his power vanish. As to his resuming the offensive attitude, he himself has not dared even to boast of it, though it would be for his immediate interest so to do ; any expectation, therefore, of such an event, must be groundless. It is as easy for Buonaparte to replunge civilized men into barbarism, and make them prefer the naked state of a savage to the luxuries of an European,—to turn the merchant into a farmer, the farmer into a manufacturer, and to reverse the habits of a whole nation, acquired and strengthened with years—an attempt, which he indeed was presumptuous and tyrannical enough to make—as to appear against the Russians in the character of an assailant. This, at least, is not in his power.

As to his personal safety, the ensuing spring will convince the world, that it owes its importance more to imagination, than reality. It was France, that made him formidable ; to break her power, to paralyze its systematic exertion, as has been done, is not only to reduce him to a mere harmless man, but to prevent her and her future rulers, from being equally formidable. The will and means of oppression were not created by him, but always existed in France, and formed a part of her political system ; these may have been directed by him with greater energy, but undoubtedly would pass the same to his successors. It is therefore of more consequence to rifle the nest, where young vultures are nursed, than to kill their guardian, who may be succeeded by another ; or to destroy the contents of the modern engine of death, than to extinguish the match, which may be relighted, and applied by another hand. The escape of Buonaparte was even necessary to complete the triumph obtained over himself and France. Had he fallen on the field, or been taken prisoner, the disasters of the French would have been altogether attributed to his absence ; and the idea, that

he could have averted them, would prevent the world from appreciating the powerful efforts of Russia ; nay, it would have blinded all Frenchmen to the reality and extent of their misfortunes ; so that, under the standard of another, they still would enlist with unabated confidence ; and France might still inspire that terror, of which she is now deprived. It is only by shewing, that France, with Buonaparte himself for her ruler, can no longer maintain her ground of elevation, that mankind in general will be convinced of the full extent of what has been done by Russia ; and they, at no distant period, will be convinced. Buonaparte may say, that his disasters were owing to the elements ; but, had he been victorious in the preceding battles, the elements would have acted rather for, than against him ; and the battles of Borodino and the Nara, could not have compelled him to remain inactive, and then to retreat in a very unfavourable season. Even when he was retracing his steps, the elements were no more inimical to him, than to his pursuers ; therefore, the excuse will not pass. The whole truth is, that he has been beaten in every encounter, each time with greater loss ;

and the result is, that he is ruined ; that, should he attempt to carry his unprecedented conscription into effect, his personal safety will be of short duration ; that his friends, if he has any, disappointed in their hopes of his recovering himself, will drop off ; and that peace, which is the darling object of Alexander, and which must humble France, is the only expedient, which can rescue Buonaparte from impending destruction.

ERRATUM.—Page 53, 16th line from bottom, for *palpable*, read *probable*.

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Reverend—Page 53, 1st line from bottom, for public.
read private

FINIS

Evstafiev, Aleksěj G.,

The Resources of Russia, in the event of a war with France with a short
description of the Cozaks

Boston 1813

Eur. 1034 g

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